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Introduction

The way to obtain a considerable tax saving promptly and also to reduce the
future tax liability of a U.S. multinational corporation is by inversion. Corporate
inversions – referred to in the tax literature as “outbound corporate inversions” – are
transactions through which the corporate structure of a U.S. based multinational group is
altered so that a new foreign corporation, typically located in country with a low or no
corporate income tax, replaces the existing U.S. parent corporation as the parent of the
group. This restructuring converts the U.S. multinational corporation in a foreign
multinational and establishes the foundation for subsequent transactions and
restructurings thatsignificantly reduce the U.S. tax exposure of the corporate group.
Corporate inversions became a noticeable phenomenon between 1998 and 2002, when a
number of major U.S. multinational corporations decided to ‘expatriate’. This wave of
corporate expatriations raised considerable concern within the government and among tax
professionals. In the debate that emerged, corporate expatriations were examined,
sometimes broadly and sometimes from a narrow technical perspective, as tax motivated
transactions with essentially tax implications.
This study attempts to shed some light on a less visible side of corporate
expatriation transactions, namely their corporate governance implications. The
conversion of the U.S.-based parent corporation of a multinational into a foreign
corporation not only alters the tax exposure of the corporate group but also changes the
law that governs intra-corporate relations. The change is likely to affect corporate
governance standards and bring about a lack of certainty and transparency in monitoring
these standards. In the post-Enron era, marked by legislative and administrative attempts
to increase transparency of corporate governance, these changes raise issues of some
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concern. Corporate expatriations were, at least temporarily, halted by the threat of
imminent legislation in the middle of year 2002. However, the core issues concerning
these transactions did not disappear, and discussion of them may aid in understanding
whether, how, and in what degree their regulation should be considered. This study will
examine the legal and economic framework in which these transactions took place, from
a novel perspective that extends beyond tax law implications. At its foundation will be
analysis of the tax issues, since corporate expatriations are essentially tax motivated
transactions, but the analysis will then extend to crucial non-tax implications of
inversions.
Parts I and II offer an introduction to the corporate inversion phenomenon,
presenting the history and forms of outbound corporate inversions. The inversion by itself
is often but a first step in a complex corporate restructuring that is designed to minimize
the multinational’s tax exposure. Therefore, the inversion transaction is described in
conjunction with the complementary transactions designed to fully carry out its
objectives.
Part III focuses on the tax effects of inversion transactions. The inversion is
designed to minimize effective U.S. taxes on international (foreign) of the inverted
multinational and also to reduce its tax liability on U.S. source income through the use of
base erosion techniques. Comparative analysis of these two objectives -- performed on
the basis of data offered by current economic studies -- is important since each has
separate and distinct tax policy implications. The inversion debate was from its inception
marked by the position of the Treasury Department which emphasized the foreign tax
saving aspect of corporate expatriations and the necessity for corresponding
comprehensive reform of the international tax system.1 Concern for the domestic tax base
erosion potential of inversions was expressed with emphasis on technical tax rules. The
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For the Treasury’s position on inversion transactions See “Corporate Inversion Transactions:
Tax Policy Implication” Preliminary Treasury Report, May 17, 2002 (hereinafter the “Treasury
Inversion Report”). See also “Testimony of Pamela Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax
Policy). U.S. Department Of Treasury before the House Committee on Ways and Means on
Corporate Inversion Transactions ”Tax Notes Today, June 7, 2002; “Statement by Deputy
Treasury Secretary Kenneth W. Dam on Corporate Inversions and on Dispute with E.U. over
Extraterritorial Income and Foreign Sales Corporation Provisions”, Tax Core, Oct. 9, 2002.
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objectives followed by inverters, and the international tax principles and technical tax
rules that affect them are discussed in this part.
Part IV examines the corporate governance changes that occur as result of the
inversion. The pre-inversion multinational’s intra-corporate relations are generally
governed by Delaware law. After the inversion, the governing corporate law is the law of
the offshore jurisdiction where the corporate group continues, usually Bermuda. This part
explores the corporate governance implications of this change through a comparative
analysis of the director’s basic duties and shareholder’s options to monitor their
performance.
The conclusion part offers an overview of the economic and legal framework that
facilitated corporate inversion, focusing on transactional costs, capital market access,
corporate decision-making and conceptual and technical tax law factors that contributed
to the phenomenon. Here also, the tax policy implications of corporate inversions that
underlay the analysis in this article will be summed up.

I.

The History of Corporate Inversions.

Tax motivated corporate restructurings of U.S.-based multinational corporations,
in which the U.S. parent corporation is replaced by a foreign corporation, thereby
converting the entity into a foreign-based multinational, are a relatively recent practice.
The first such major restructuring, which attracted significant attention by the IRS, was
the 1983 McDermott transaction, discussed below, which took advantage of a gap in the
Subpart F regime of the Internal Revenue Code to remove non-taxed passive income
from U.S. taxing jurisdiction. The deficiency in the Subpart F rules identified by
McDermott was promptly remedied by the adoption of a narrowly constrained section of
the Code which denied the specific benefit that was the object of that transaction.
Then in 1994 another corporation found moving offshore tax effective. Helen of
Troy inverted into a Bermuda corporation, based on the expectation of creating enhanced
post-inversion stockholder value by achieving a the lower post-inversion effective tax
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rate.2 The inversion transaction was so structured that it was not taxable to the inverting
corporation’s shareholders. Again, the IRS responded promptly, this time by adopting
regulations making the gain on the exchange of shares in the inversion taxable, and
thereby imposing a shareholder level “toll-charge” on corporate inversions. This
shareholder level tax seemed to be an effective deterrent until 1998-1999 when the new
wave of outbound inversions began. This third wave resulted in the offshore reincorporation of 17 U.S. multinationals by the middle of the year 2002, and it was
ultimately halted by the risk of imminent anti- inversion legislation; that legislation – the
content of which is not readily predictable – remains forthcoming as this article is
written).
The history of inversions is reported in detail elsewhere3 and need not be repeated
here. Nevertheless, some of the transactions that have been undertaken require
discussion to allow an understanding of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the
measures taken and those under consideration to address the tax and other issues raised
by the inversion phenomenon.
The purpose and form of the McDermott transaction were very different from
inversions as known today. Shareholders of McDermott exchanged their shares for stock
of McDermott International, an existing Panamanian subsidiary with substantial earnings
and profits, and ended up owning 90% of the latter corporation. The transaction
apparently was deliberately structured to be taxable to allow exchanging shareholders to
recognize loss on the exchange.4 The inversion had the further benefit of removing from
U.S. taxing jurisdiction the earnings that had been accumulated in McDermott
International while it was a controlled foreign corporation (CFC).5 Absent the inversion,
2

See text at note10, infra.
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For a complete account of the history of corporate inversions see D.R. Tillinghast, Recent
Developments In International Mergers Acquisitions and Restructurings 72 Taxes 1061 (1994);
H. Hicks, Overview Of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical, Contemporary and
Transactional Perspectives, 30 Tax Notes Int’l 899 (June 2, 2003).
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The details and objectives of the McDermott transaction are extensively described in
Tillinghast, op. cit. supra note 3 at 1063.
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Following the inversion McDermott owned only about 10%, whereas former McDermott
shareholders owned approximately 90%, of the stock of McDermott International.
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the accumulated earnings would have been taxed to McDermott as a dividend under §
1248 upon the sale of the stock or the liquidation of McDermott International.6 Since, in
form, McDermott made no disposition of stock to which § 1248 could apply, those
accumulated earnings had by this transaction been effectively removed from U.S. taxing
jurisdiction.8 In response to the transaction Congress adopted §1248(i) of the Code,
which applies when a domestic corporation owns CFC stock and a shareholder exchanges
stock of the domestic corporation for stock of the controlled foreign corporation.9 The
stock received in the exchange is treated as being issued to the domestic corporation and
then transferred to its shareholders in a distribution in redemption or liquidation. The
domestic corporation thus recognizes gain on the constructive distribution, resulting in a
tax cost that neutralizes the benefits from a McDermott type transaction.
“The 1994 Helen of Troy transaction was the first of the modern wave of
outbound inversions and has come to be regarded as the prototypical pure inversion
transaction.”10 The transaction involved the tax-free exchange by Helen of Troy - U.S.
shareholders of their shares for the shares of a newly established Bermuda corporation,
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Unless otherwise indicated, all section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended (the “Code”).
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The IRS unsuccessfully sought redress arguing that McDermott shareholders received a taxable
distribution from McDermott pursuant to Section 304(a). See Bhada v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 959
(1987), aff’d 892 F 2d 39 (6th Cir. 1989)
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The IRS unsuccessfully sought redress arguing that McDermott shareholders received a taxable
distribution from McDermott pursuant to Section 304(a). See Bhada v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 959
(1987), aff’d 892 F. 2d 39 (6th Cir. 1989).
9

The legislative history describes the McDermott transaction, but without specific reference as
the type of targeted transaction. See Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 962 (1985).
10

Report of New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, on Outbound Inversion Transactions,
Tax Notes, July 1, 2002, 129 (hereinafter “The NYSBA Report”).
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Helen of Troy – Bermuda, in accordance with Code § 368(a)(1)(B). Under the rules then
in effect § 367(a) did not apply to require recognition of gain on the exchange by the
shareholders. Subsequent to the inversion Helen of Troy - Bermuda contributed its stock
in the U.S. corporation to a Barbados corporation to obtain the benefit of the U.S.Barbados income tax treaty for payments of interest or dividends originating from the
U.S. corporation. At this point, however, Helen of Troy -U.S. and its shareholders had
not yet removed themselves from the reach of the CFC rules. Subsequently, therefore,
through a number of intra-group sales, the assets (operating assets/stock) of the U.S.
corporation were transferred to affiliated corporations, including newly created Cayman
Island and Hong Kong affiliates.11 The income generated by these assets and operations
ceased to be subject to the current inclusion rules of Subpart F. Similarly all future
acquisitions could be structured through foreign (non CFC) affiliates to avoid the
application of the Subpart F rules.
The IRS did not choose to attack the particular tax avoidance devices of the
Helen of Troy transaction, 12 but instead it adopted regulations designed to prevent
inversions ab initio.13 Gains on all transfers by U.S. persons of stock or securities of a
domestic corporation to a foreign corporation were made fully taxable under § 367(a) if
the U.S. transferors owned in the aggregate 50% or more in vote or value of the
transferee foreign corporation immediately after the exchange. Imposition of this “tollcharge” on the shareholders of the inverting corporation was based on the assumption
that requiring the recognition of the built in gain on the stock would act as a deterrent
against future inversions.
The shareholder level capital tax lost its deterrent function as stock market prices
fell (resulting in potential losses, rather than gains, on inversion exchanges) and as the
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Tillinghast, op. cit. supra note 3 at 1065.
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NYSBA Report at 130.
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Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356. The notice was examined in the NYSBA Tax Section, Report
on Notice 94-46 Relating To Certain Outbound Stock Transfers, Tax Notes (Nov. 14, 1994) at
913. Temporary and proposed regulations implementing the notice were issued on December 26,
1995 (60 FR 66739 and 66771). Final regulations, which modified the temporary regulations only
slightly, were issued in 1997; Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c), T.D. 872, 1997-8 IRB 4.
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market acceptance of inverted companies increased. Potential inverters begun to focus on
the base erosion benefits of corporate inversions. The result was an unprecedented wave
of outbound inversions between 1998 and 2002. Economic studies reveal that the
inverting companies had a number of common characteristics. Inverting firms were
considerably larger than the median firm in their industries, and had lower levels of
leverage and higher overall effective tax rates than their industry average. Certain
inverting firms belonged to the same industry category.14 This pattern seems to suggest
that tax savings resulting from outbound corporate expatriations offer strong incentives to
expatriate for corporations with certain characteristics from the same industry group. In
other words, inversion appears in part an issue of maintaining competitiveness with other
inverted American corporations. These factors make clear that if the underlying reasons
for inversion are not addressed, outbound inversion is might develop into a mass
movement.
The mid-year 2002 abandonment of the proposed inversion of Stanley Works15
brought the inversion debate to the center of public attention. Anti-inversion measures
were suggested, some with retroactive effect.16 These proposals alone were sufficient to
halt inversion transactions at this point. The various legislative proposals have not yet
materialized in a final regulatory measure, although the adoption of a law that deals with
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Oil & Gas: Triton Energy, Transocean Offshore, Nabors Industries, Noble Drilling. Insurance
Carriers: PXRE Corporation, Everest Reinsurance, White Mountain, Leucadia National. Tools &
Appliances: Foster Wheeler, Cooper Industries, Ingersoll –Rand, Stanley Works (inversion
abandoned).
15

For a case study on The Stanley Works inversion, see M.A. Desai & J.R. Hines, Expectations
and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 National
Tax Journal 409 (2002).
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The legislative proposals intended to address some, many, or almost all aspects relating to
inversions and similar transactions. These have included the REPO Bill (S. 2119), the RECAP
Bill (S. 3120), the Wellstone Bill (S. 2050), the Corporate Patriot Enforcement Bill (H.R. 3884),
the McInnis Bill (H.R. 3857), the Save America's Jobs Bill (H.R. 3922), the Uncle Sam Wants
You Bill (H.R. 4756), the No Tax Breaks for Corporations Renouncing America Bill (H.R. 4993),
and the American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Bill (H.R. 5095). These bills
address as a group a wide range of issues, including preventing inversions, leveling the playing
field, preventing the avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign income, and preventing the reduction of
U.S. tax on domestic income.
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the inversion phenomenon – whether directly or through its ancillary aspects – seems to
be likely.17

II.

The Form of the Transaction.
Since the core element of the inversion transaction is establishment of the parent

corporation as a foreign corporation, the first step must be substitution of a foreign
corporation for the existing U.S. parent corporation. This substitution may take a variety
of forms.
The form of the inversion transaction may affect not only the immediate tax
characteristics of the transaction, but also the corporate and disclosure mechanics that
must be carried out in order for the transaction to be effected. It should be emphasized at
the outset – as will be demonstrated later in the article – that the inversion transaction
itself normally does not carry out the purposes for which inversion is undertaken. Rather,
it only establishes the framework under which other and related transactions (such as
asset and share transfers, recapitalizations, issuances of debt, creations of new
subsidiaries, etc.) may be carried out. These related transactions, normally viewed as part
of the inversion transaction itself, are examined separately at the end of this section of the
article.
Nevertheless, the form of the initial transaction is crucial for a number of reasons.
First, it sets the terms on which the initial transaction will be taxed, and thereby
determines whether – and to what extent – the inverting company or its shareholders will
need to pay up-front tax costs. Second, it may affect the nature of the corporate
disclosure and corporate formalities necessary to undertake the transaction. Finally – and
crucially for purposes of this article – it creates a new top-level corporate structure, which
alters significantly not only the tax structure of the enterprise, but its corporate and
regulatory structure as well.
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The most current legislative proposal is contained in the FY 2004 Budget, released by the
Administration on February 3, 2003 and it addresses the change of earnings stripping rules. The
proposed Energy Tax Policy Act (H.R. 1531) contains a temporary moratorium on inversion
transactions by treating inverting corporations as U.S. entities.
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The principal forms of inversion are the so-called “share inversion”, normally
effected by means of a three-party (“triangular”) merger, and the so-called “asset
inversion”, normally carried out by transfer of assets to a newly-created corporation.
Alternatively, the transaction may combine aspects of share and asset inversion to
achieve the desired top-level corporate structure. These three forms are described in
detail below.

A.

“Share Inversions” through acquisition of the stock of the existing U.S. parent.

The object of this form is to establish a new foreign corporation (“Newco”) that
becomes the parent of the existing U.S. corporation (“USco”).18 In its simplest form, this
transaction might be achieved by having the USco shareholders exchange all of their
stock for shares of Bermudaco – a classic “B” reorganization19 – but unless USco is held
by a small number of shareholders all of whom agree with the transaction,20 this
apparently simple procedure is unfeasible. The alternative, widely used in other
reorganization and acquisition transactions in the United States, is the three-party merger,
known generally as a “triangular” or “reverse triangular” merger, depending upon which
corporation survives the transaction. Most of the reported share inversions, have taken
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Further changes in corporate structure, possibly including transfers among lower-tier
corporations or change of the incorporation jurisdiction of lower-tier corporations, are likely to be
essential to the plan of inversion. See text at note 55, infra.
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IRC § 368(a)(1)(B). As will be noted below, qualification for reorganization treatment at the
shareholder level will be irrelevant, since gain recognition will be required by § 367(a).
However, preservation of non-recognition at the corporate level is crucial, and therefore
qualification as a reorganization is also crucial. The transaction might alternatively qualify for
non-recognition treatment under § 351.

20

The “B” reorganization would require that 80% or more of the stock of USco be exchanged
“solely for” voting stock of Bermudaco. Achieving such an exchange with respect to the stock of
a publicly-held corporation is normally very difficult, if not impossible, since it requires that the
shareholders tender their shares for exchange.
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the form of the reverse triangular merger, with the result that after the inversion, USco
becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bermudaco.21
The corporate law requirements to carry out the transaction are generally
straightforward. The merger will require a vote of the shareholders of USco,22 and the
terms of the merger will be that shares of USco will become shares of Bermudaco, and
USco will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bermudaco.23 Since, as a publicly-held
corporation, the stock of USco will be registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the vote of the shareholders of USco will fall under the proxy rules and the
associated disclosure requirements.24
The reverse triangular merger, if qualified as a reorganization,25 would normally
result in nonrecognition of gain or loss by both the shareholders of USco and by USco
itself.26 However, the usual nonrecognition rules applicable to reorganizations are
substantially modified when the reorganization involves a foreign corporation (i.e., when
it includes an outbound transfer of assets or stock). In that case, the shareholders will be
required to recognize any realized gain on the exchange, but will nevertheless be denied
the ability to recognize any loss thereon.27 Therefore, when the shares of USco have
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Share inversions include Helen of Troy Ltd., Prospectus/Proxy Statement January 5, 1994;
Triton Energy Corporation, Prospectus/Proxy Statement February 23, 1996; Fruit of the Loom,
Inc., Prospectus/Proxy Statement October 15, 1998; Everest Group Re. Ltd. Proxy
Statement/Prospectus January 2000; Nabors Industries, Prospectus/Proxy Statement March 22,
2002; Weatherford Industries, Inc., Prospectus/Proxy Statement April 5, 2002.

22

See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 251(c).

23

See Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 251(b)(5), which allows the merger agreement to provide for
conversion of the shares of a constituent corporation to a merger into “cash, property, rights or
securities of any other corporation or entity.”
24

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, §§ 12 (registration requirement), 13
(periodical and other reports), 15 USC §§ 78m, 78n; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Regulation 13A: Reports of Issuers of Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12.

25

See IRC § 368(a)(2)(E).

26

IRC § 354 (nonrecognition by exchanging shareholders); IRC §§ 361, 362 (nonrecognition by
corporations).
27

Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c). These are the regulations, discussed earlier – see text at note 13,
supra – that were adopted in response to the Helen of Troy transaction.
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substantially appreciated prior to the planned share inversion, it would appear that
shareholders will pay – as the price or “toll charge” of the inversion – potentially
significant taxes on their gains. On the other side, when the shares of USco have
substantially declined in price prior to the planned share inversion, it would appear that
shareholders would lose the immediate benefit of recognizing any losses on the
exchange.
A closer examination of the share ownership of inverting corporations may raise
questions about these initial conclusions. Of course, in periods of stock market decline,
the inversion is likely to produce no gain for the exchanging shareholders; moreover,
appropriate tax planning – in particular, structuring the transaction to disqualify
reorganization treatment28 – can assure that shareholders are able to recognize any
realized losses. But even in periods of stock appreciation, it can normally be expected
that a relatively small percentage of the stockholders of a publicly-traded corporation will
be subjected to tax on the gain realized in the exchange. First, a significant portion of all
publicly-traded stock is held by so-called “zero bracket” institutional investors29 – such as
pension funds – that pay no taxes on current income or capital gains. Second, a
significant portion of the stock is usually held by short-term traders, whose basis
(purchase price) is often at or close to the market. Third, when the former U.S. parent has
a relatively small group of founding shareholders, who own significant blocks of
appreciated stock, the exchangeable share technique might be used to postpone the
shareholder level tax.30 Finally, some long-term holdings are usually held by the heirs of
the original purchasers, with the result that the basis of the stock in their hands – though
not necessarily at the current market price – is nevertheless considerably higher than its
28

One of several ways to assure non-reorganization status is to structure the transaction as a
disqualified, or “broken” reverse triangular merger under IRC §368(a)(2)(E). This is readily
achieved, for example, by issuing in excess of 20% “boot” in the transaction.

29

See the discussion at note 191, infra.

30

These transactions allowed U.S. shareholders to exchange their stock in USco for units, each
consisting of a stock of Bermudaco and one share of convertible preferred in USco. The
recognition of the gain allocated to the newly issued exchangeable stock is postponed until the
effective exchange into Bermudaco stock. This technique was used by Fruit of the Loom, Gold
and Triton Energy. See Hicks, op cit supra note 3 at 910-911.
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original purchase price.31 In short, the threat of a “toll charge” is not likely, in most
circumstances, to act as a significant deterrent to an inversion transaction, since most
shareholders will not have to pay it.

B.

Asset inversions
In contrast to share inversions that partially change the corporate structure, by

superimposing a foreign corporation over the existing U.S. corporation, an asset inversion
is a complete corporate restructuring that eliminates the former U.S. parent (USco) and
replaces it with the new foreign parent corporation (Bermudaco). Foreign corporations
held directly in a chain by USco prior to inversion are controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs) which therefore generate a U.S. tax liability on USco with respect to certain
categories of passive or highly mobile types of income, i.e., Subpart F income. When
USco is converted into a non-CFC foreign corporation32 these foreign subsidiaries held
in the chain are also converted, eliminating any Subpart F exposure with respect to the
income of these companies.33 However, while this type of inversion may de-control
more controlled foreign corporations than a share inversion, it does so at a significant
corporate tax cost.
For corporate law purposes, an asset inversion is typically carried out as a two
step reincorporation. First, USco –generally a Delaware corporation -- re-incorporates in
a state that does not require a 100% shareholder approval for a domestic-to-foreign
reincorporation,34 and then it “continues” or reincorporates in a foreign jurisdiction. The
31

See IRC § 1014, which provides for a step-up in basis with respect to stock passing through a
decedent’s estate.

32

The new foreign parent corporation is publicly held which will facilitate the avoidance of CFC
shareholder status for its shareholders. The anti-deferral rules are examined below: see text at
note 88, infra.

33

Controlled foreign corporations held through U.S. subsidiaries will, however, retain their CFC
status after the transactions.
34

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3226 (transfer of domicile of corporation), 10-1003 (majority
shareholder vote required, as in amendments of articles of incorporation) (2003); Tex. Bus. Corp.
Act arts. 5.17 – 5.20 (conversion), 5.03 (two-thirds shareholder vote required, as in a merger)
(2003);
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U.S.- foreign reincorporation cannot be carried out through the use of the Delaware
continuation procedure, with the consequence that the advantages of Delaware law are
lost at this point.35 The second step of the transaction may be facilitated if the jurisdiction
has a statutorily recognized continuation procedure. Bermuda, the preferred target
destination of inverting corporations, has such a continuation statute.36 As a result of the
transaction USco is automatically converted into Bermudaco, the new Bermuda parent,
and USco’s outstanding stock is automatically converted into stock of Bermudaco.37
The transaction carries a substantial tax cost. For federal income tax purposes the
continuation should qualify as an F reorganization,38 provided it meets the technical and
doctrinal requirements thereof. The reorganization must meet the continuity of interest
and continuity of business enterprise tests and have a valid business purpose. While the
transaction would normally meet the continuity tests, a potential issue, given the
prominence of U.S. tax planning, is whether the transaction has a valid business purpose.
Asset inversions undertaken to date seem to have assumed that the business purpose test
was satisfied,40 despite what appear – on the face of the disclosure documents – to be
essentially exclusively tax-saving motivations. The business purpose test is particularly
35

Delaware law requires unanimous shareholder vote for the continuation of a Delaware
corporation outside the state. When the continuation procedure is applicable, the continuing
corporation may retain the application of Delaware law in the foreign jurisdiction. Del. Gen.
Corp. L. §390.
36

§ 132C Companies Act 1981 states that a body incorporated outside Bermuda (hereafter in this
Part referred to as a "foreign corporation") may, subject to certain conditions be continued in
Bermuda as an exempted company. The conditions that need to be satisfied for continuation are
administrative, including providing a memorandum of continuance and financial statements, and
payment of a fee. For the analogous Cayman Islands continuation procedure, see § 222 Cayman
Islands Company Law (2001 revision).

37

Examples of this type of transactions include Xoma Corporation, Prospectus/Proxy Statement,
November 30, 1998; White Mountain Insurance Group, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, September
23, 1999.
38

Alternatively, the transaction might qualify as a C or non-divisive D reorganization.

40

Commentators have raised the question whether asset inversions would qualify as valid F
reorganizations in the absence of a compelling business purpose. See, e.g., NYSBA Report at
138; Hicks, op. cit. supra note 3 at 912.
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important: if that requirement is not met, the reincorporation will be taxed at both
shareholder and corporate level.
If the reincorporation qualifies as an F, C or non-divisive D reorganization, the
shareholders of USco should be entitled to non-recognition of gain or loss on the
transaction,41 and § 367(a) will not impose any tax at the shareholder level.42 However,
the reincorporation is fully taxable to USco at the corporate level, since the
reorganization involves a deemed transfer of assets by USco to Bermudaco. USco, the
former U.S. parent, is effectively treated as having sold all its assets to Bermudaco, the
new Bermuda corporation. This outbound asset transfer is taxable.43 If USco owned
controlled foreign corporations, it will also incur dividend income as result of the deemed
sales of the stock thereof pursuant to § 1248.
This high tax cost is likely to make asset inversion impracticable in the absence of
offsetting tax attributes. When USco has offsetting tax attributes – such as net operating
losses or excess foreign tax credits – the § 367(a) tax cost may be minimized. Because of
the costs, asset inversions have been infrequently chosen as a form of corporate
restructuring. Not surprisingly corporations that inverted using this structure – White
Mountain Insurance44 and Xoma45 – chose this structure since they incurred minimal or
no tax cost through the use of offsetting tax attributes..

C.

41

Combined Inversions

IRC § 354(a).

42

In the absence of an “indirect stock transfer” an outbound F reorganization does not involve a §
354 stock transfer that is subject to § 367(a).
43

§ 367(a)(5) provides that an outbound C, D or F reorganization may not be rendered taxexempt by § 367(a)(2) and § 367(a)(3), and therefore the transfer is fully taxable under § 367(a).
44

Tax cost were estimated to be between $5 million and $20 million. White Mountain Insurance
Group, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, September 23, 1999.

45

Xoma corporation had accumulated considerable net operating losses prior to the inversion.
This trend was expected to change with the imminent approval of a new product developed by the
company. The inversion was scheduled to occur while the corporation was still a loss corporation.
Xoma Corporation, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, November 30, 1998.

14

Combined inversions bring together elements of both share inversions and asset
inversions.46 The intention is to combine the various transactions to minimize the overall
tax costs while attaining optimal tax efficiency. The first step of the transaction is
structured in substantially the same way as an asset inversion. The parent corporation
(USco) reincorporates in a U.S. jurisdiction that allows U.S.-to-foreign reincorporation
without unanimous shareholder consent, and subsequently “continues” by
reincorporation (e.g., as Bermudaco) in a foreign jurisdiction. The second step of the
transaction consist of the transfer of certain assets deemed received by Bermudaco to a
newly formed U.S. subsidiary (USnewsub) in exchange for the stock of USnewsub. The
choice of the assets ‘re-transferred’ to USnewsub depends on the overall mix of the assets
originally held by USco, the appreciation of the assets and the availability of tax
attributes that may offset the gain inherent in appreciated assets. Assets without a
significant built-in gain (e.g. recently purchased foreign subsidiaries, financial
instruments) will generally be retained by Bermudaco. By contrast, appreciated assets
and U.S. assets will generally be re-transferred to USnewsub.
The initial continuation of USco, structured as an F, C or nondivisive D
reorganization, is a taxable transaction at the USco corporate level, as seen in the case of
asset inversions. However, the asset drop-down changes the character and the tax
consequences of a portion of the transaction.
Related asset drop-downs may occur in certain reorganizations without affecting
the characterization of the top tier reorganization.47 Combined transactions have
traditionally been treated as an outbound C reorganizations followed by a § 368(a)(2)(C)
drop.48 In the first step, USco reincorporates abroad directly, or through a jurisdiction
that facilitates reincorporation without unanimous shareholder consent. This step is

46

The NYSBA Report, at p. 133, refers to this type of inversion under the heading “F or C
reorganizations followed by a drop-down to the U.S. holding corporation.” This transaction is
also referred to as a “drop down transaction;” see Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 17.
47

See IRC § 368(a)(2)(C), which on its face is applicable only to A, B, C and G reorganizations.

48

Examples of this type of transaction include TransOcean Offshore, Prospectus/Proxy Statement
April 12, 1999; Foster Wheeler Corporation, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, March 9, 2001.
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analogous to the asset inversion. In the second step, as part of the same transaction, the
offshore parent corporation drops some of its assets to USnewsub, the newly formed
U.S. subsidiary. The transaction might be characterized as an outbound D reorganization
followed by a § 368(2)(C) type drop.50Alternatively, it is possible that the top tier
reorganization may be treated as an outbound F reorganization followed by an ‘unrelated’
contribution of property by Bermudaco to USnewsub.51
The overall transaction is viewed as containing two elements: (a) an outbound
transfer by USco of all its assets to Bermudaco, except those assets deemed retransferred to USnewsub, and (b) an indirect outbound transfer by the shareholders of
USco of domestic stock – the stock of USnewsub as a partial successor of USco – to the
extent of the assets retransferred by Bermudaco to USnewsub. Accordingly, the
transaction generates tax at both the shareholder and the U.S. parent corporation level.
The assets retained by Bermudaco (the new offshore parent) are considered transferred in
an outbound asset transfer, with gain recognition by USco (the formerU.S. parent).52 The
other part of the transaction -- the deemed exchange of stock by U.S. shareholder to the
extent of assets deemed ‘re-transferred’ to USnewsub (the newly created U.S.
subsidiary), generates tax liability at the shareholder level.53 The resulting corporate level
tax may be minimized by limiting the assets effectively transferred to Bermudaco to
those without substantial built-in gain and by the use of offsetting tax attributes. The
shareholder level tax might be less significant to the extent that the shareholder base
contains tax exempt investors or the share prices reflect built-in losses.54 Because of the

49

§ 368(a)(1)(C)

50

See Rev. Rul. 2002-85, 2002-52 IRB 968, confirming that a subsequent drop-down will not
disqualify a D reorganization.
51

For the characterization of these transaction See Hicks, op. cit supra note 3 at 913-915;
NYSBA Report at ¶ 17.
52

53

IRC § 367(a)(5).
Treas. Reg. §1.367(a)-3(c).

54

It has been suggested that the shareholder level tax liability can be reduced if USnewsub
assumes liabilities of USco which will drive down the value of USnewsub. See Hicks, op. cit.
supra note 3 at 915.
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tax costs that are imposed at both shareholder and corporate level, and the complexity
imposed by the tax planning techniques designed to minimize these costs, combined
inversions are relatively infrequent forms of outbound corporate restructuring.

D.

Associated transactions to carry out the objectives of outbound corporate

restructuring.
Generally, the inversion in and of itself does not carry out completely the
objectives of the outbound corporate restructuring. Inversions aim to minimize tax
liability on foreign source income and reduce tax liability on U.S. source income. These
objectives, their relative importance and the legal framework in which they operate will
be examined in detail in the next part of this article. The first objective of an inversion is
to restructure the multinational to minimize tax exposure on income earned abroad. In
order to achieve this objective the inversion is often combined with related CFC and
other restructuring. The second objective is to reduce tax liability on U.S. source income.
In order to achieve this objective the inversion is frequently accompanied by base erosion
techniques.

(1)

Controlled foreign corporation restructuring.
The United States subjects to current taxation, through its anti-deferral rules,

certain types of income earned abroad by foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. multinational
which qualify as controlled foreign corporations .55 The inversion transaction has the
objective of elimination or reduction of this taxation by decontrolling the foreign
subsidiaries through transferring their ownership to the foreign parent or sister
corporations.
However, the share inversion by itself does not produce any change in the status
of the existing controlled foreign corporations. The transaction merely superimposes a
new offshore parent over the pre-inversion U.S. parent, which, absent any other
restructuring, continues to hold all existing foreign subsidiaries. Of course, newly

55

The operation of the anti-deferral rules to the extent necessary for an understanding of
viewpoints developed in the inversion debate is discussed at text at note 88 infra.
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established foreign operations can be structured to be held directly by the new Bermuda
parent corporation with no U.S. tax liability attaching.
Asset inversions, by contrast, de-control all foreign subsidiaries held directly or
through a chain of CFCs, by eliminating the pre-inversion U.S. parent corporation and
replacing it by the new Bermuda parent. However, to the extent that U.S. corporations
are maintained in the chain of ownership (i.e., U.S. subsidiaries of the pre-inversion U.S.
parent) tax liability may still attach with respect to the foreign subsidiaries held directly
in the chain by these U.S. corporations. Thus the asset inversion is likely to de-control all
or a part of the foreign subsidiaries, but – as we have seen – at considerable tax cost.
The combination inversion contains elements of both inversions. This transaction
may de-control certain foreign subsidiaries by keeping them, after the initial outbound
transfer of assets, at the Bermuda parent level and not re-contributing them to the newly
created U.S. subsidiary.
In short, the basic inversion transaction often leaves many CFCs still subject to
the U.S. anti- deferral regime. Therefore companies undertaking inversions often engage –
simultaneously with or subsequently to the inversion -- in transactions designed to
restructure their CFC ownership and foreign operations.
A preferred technique for de-controlling CFCs as part of a stock-inversion
transaction has been the creation of a cross-ownership structure through the use of socalled “hook” or “tail-and-hook” stock.56 In this transaction USco (the former U.S.
parent corporation, now a subsidiary of Bermudaco) transfers stock of the foreign CFCs
to Bermudaco or to a foreign affiliate thereof. Immediately before or at the time of the
inversion USco may transfer the CFCs to Bermudaco by exchanging the stock of the
CFCs for a second class of common stock of Bermudaco. The stock received in the
exchange is non-voting stock that carries the same rights as the common stock received
by USco’s shareholders in the stock inversion.57 The resulting structure is open to

56

Examples of this type of transaction include Ingersoll Rand Company, Ltd., Prospectus/Proxy
Statement, December 2001; Coopers Industries Inc., Registration Statement, March 8, 2002.
57

See Treasury Inversion Report at ¶19.
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possible criticism, since it results in cross-ownership: USco becomes both a stockholder
and a subsidiary of Bermudaco.58
Disclosures have generally taken the position that a share inversion accompanied
by a transfer of CFCs for tail-and-hook stock does not generate a substantial tax liability
at the corporate level, without providing any further explanation. The public disclosure
documents are ambiguous about the characterization of these transactions. The transfer
may take the form of a contribution of property under § 351 of the Code, provided the
statutory conditions are met.59 The basis for this position would appear to be that a single
§ 351 transaction occurs, consisting of two parts. One part is the transfer of shares by
shareholders of USco for stock of Bermudaco. The second part is the transfer by USco of
its stock in the CFCs for stock of Bermudaco.. The combined transferors have control of
Bermudaco immediately after the transfers within § 368(c) and therefore, arguably,
qualify as § 351 transferors. If this characterization is respected, USco is deemed to have
exchanged foreign stock for foreign stock in a § 351 transaction, without having incurred
tax liability (except the § 1248 amount, if any, embedded in the transferred shares)
provided it enters into a gain recognition agreement. Alternatively the proxy statements
may make the factual assumption that, absent a transaction that warrants non-recognition
treatment, the fair market value of the stock received in the exchange (i.e. the amount
realized in the exchange) is not materially greater than the basis of the stock given up in
the exchange.60 There is some ambiguity in the basis of the positions taken by the
companies and commentators.
CFCs may also be de-controlled through transactions that occur after the
completion of the (share or combined) inversion. The stock of the foreign corporation
58

The cross-ownership structure carries a considerable risk for U.S. investors. A high ownership
percentage of USco in Bermudaco increases the likelihood that Bermudaco qualifies as a CFC.
The potential post inversion subpart F exposure on Bermudaco was raised with respect to the
inversion of Ingersoll-Rand which put in place a tail-and-hook structure in which 45% of
Bermudaco was owned by USco and its U.S. subsidiaries.

59

See NYSBA Report at 133. IRC § 351 allows tax free contribution of property to a controlled
corporation.
60

See Coopers Industries, Inc., Registration Statement, March 8, 2002. asserting that the stock
received in the exchange had the same value.
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may be distributed to the new foreign parent as a dividend. Alternatively the stock of
CFCs may be sold to the new offshore parent or its affiliates. These arrangements seems
to be the most frequently contemplated technique for de-controlling CFCs postinversion.61 Shareholders have no vote with respect to these transactions, which occur at
the level of the subsidiaries of the new offshore parent and are controlled by the latter.
This marks a considerable difference from the pre-inversion scenario, when a decision of
USco to dispose of substantially all of its assets required shareholder approval.62

(2)

Transactions to optimize U.S. base erosion.
Inversions are often accompanied by transactions that involve the creation of

inter-company indebtedness, generating future interest expense that reduces the taxable
income for the U.S. members of the post-inversion multinational. Several techniques are
available to inject tax efficient leverage into the inverted corporation. These techniques
have been discussed elsewhere in detail and therefore, we will refer only to a few that are
frequently used.63
One technique that USco may employ is to contribute an existing (high basis
intercompany) loan to Bermudaco in exchange for a second class of Bermudaco common
stock. This type of transaction will likely involve stock with characteristics similar to the
tail-and-hook stock used to de-control CFCs (i.e. stock that carries rights similar to other
common stock, but restricted voting power). Alternatively, USco may distribute a note to
Bermudaco as a dividend. In either case, the payment of post-transaction interest on the
indebtedness generates an interest deduction for the U.S. corporation or corporations,
thereby reducing taxable U.S. income.

III.`

The Tax Effects of Corporate Inversion

A.

Introduction.

61

See Fruit of the Loom, Prospectus/Proxy Statement supra note 23, TransOcean Offshore,
Prospectus/Proxy Statement, supra 48.
62

63

See, e.g. Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 271(a) (requiring majority shareholder vote).
See Hicks, op. cit. supra note 3 at 916-919.
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An outbound corporate inversion has been described as a technically complicated
but operationally essentially transparent transaction.64 It does not bring about any
meaningful change in the management or operations of the multinational corporation.
While the inverted corporation has a new residence for corporate law purposes in a lowtax or non-tax jurisdiction (usually Bermuda) and usually establishes residence for treaty
tax purposes in a jurisdiction that allows access to the U.S. treaty network (usually
Barbados) the locations of its economic operations worldwide remain unchanged.
Furthermore, it is likely that the effective control of its operations continues to be
exercised from the United States. SEC filings often explicitly state that the transaction
does not carry any material change with respect to the operation and management of the
inverted corporation.65
The inversion also does not bring about any change with respect to the inverted
corporation’s access to U.S. capital markets. Since foreign corporations that comply with
the U.S. accounting and disclosure rules have direct access to the NYSE, the inverted
corporation maintains its NYSE listing under the ticker symbol used prior to inversion.67
The inverted corporation does not incur any substantial additional cost to maintain its
NYSE listing. Moreover the corporations continues to be eligible for inclusion in the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index by virtue of its trading on the NYSE.68 The inverted
corporations’ continued listing in the S&P 500 secures its eligibility for investment by
index investors. The inverted corporations as Bermuda corporations would otherwise

64

Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 5..

65

See, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 56; Ingersoll-Rand,
Prospectus/Proxy Statement, supra note 56.

66

In contrast to the prior practice of trading through depository receipts.

67

The ability to use the same ticker symbol is often a condition of the underlying merger
agreement.

68

Continued listing in the S&P 500 was initially subject to ambiguity. Subsequently statement by
the S&P 500 clarified the issue in favor of inverters. The Standard & Poor’s Index Committee.
Press Release, July 9, 2002. Available at www.standardpoors.com and www.spglobal.com
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have no access to a system of indices, and would be excluded from an index investor’s
portfolio.69
Outbound corporate inversions are carried out for the purpose and with the
expectation of obtaining considerable immediate and future tax savings.70 The inverted
corporation’s tax liability on its foreign source income will decrease as result of the
inversion. This effect will be referred to as post-inversion tax saving on foreign source
income. Although theU.S. taxing jurisdiction extends over the worldwide operations of
U.S. based multinationals, its taxing jurisdiction over foreign based multinationals is
limited to their U.S. operations. The inverted corporation’s tax liability on U.S. source
income may also be reduced through certain base erosion techniques not available to U.S.
multinationals. This effect will be referred to as post inversion saving on U.S. source
income. Since the inverted corporation is taxed only on its U.S. source income, the
inversion opens up the prospect of effectively reducing U.S. income through so-called
earning stripping and through inter-company transactions which create foreign income
and corresponding U.S. expense items. The expenses reduce U.S. taxable income, while
the corresponding foreign income items are structured to fall outside the reach of the U.S.
taxing jurisdiction.
The techniques for post-inversion tax saving on foreign source income and those
for post inversion saving on U.S. source income have different policy implications. Postinversion tax savings on foreign income raise concerns with respect to the removal of non
U.S. source income from the ambit of U.S. worldwide taxation and the creation of what

69

Bermuda has no index system, as part of the global system of indices. Id. Studies estimating the
effect of being listed by the S&P 500 on the value of corporate stock indicate that the inclusion in
the index increases the price on average by 8.5% from the time when the inclusion is announced
to the time when it becomes effective. R. J.Bos, Event Study: Quantifying the Effect of Being
Added to an S&P Index (2002), available at www.spglobal.com/EventStudy.pdf
70

E.g. Ingersoll-Rand reported an expected annual saving on U.S. taxes of $40 million; see
Ingersoll-Rand Company, Ltd., Prospectus/Proxy Statement/, April 5, 2002. Cooper Industries
expected a reduction of its effective tax rate by 12% - 17%, amounting to an expected annual
saving of $54 million; see Coopers Industries, Ltd., Prospectus/Proxy Statement, July 27, 2001.
Stanley Works reported an expected reduction of its effective tax rate by 7%- 9%, amounting to
expected tax savings of $30 million; see Stanley Works, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, April 2,
2002.
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has been called “self-help territoriality.”71 It has been argued that these techniques are
employed in response to the “competitive disadvantage” faced by U.S. multinationals
because of the worldwide reach of U.S. taxing jurisdiction.72 One suggested approach to
this issue is reevaluation of the principles of international taxation. By contrast, post
inversion tax savings on U.S. source income have as their objective diminution of the
multinational’s taxable income from U.S. sources, achieved through the use of base
erosion techniques, devices to reduce or erode the U.S. income tax base of the
multinational. One solution to this problem that has been suggested is to eliminate the
base erosion benefits for inverted corporations bystrengthening already applicable
technical tax rules.73 Outbound corporate inversions appear to be clearly motivated by
both objectives, and it is difficult to ascertain the relative importance of each.
Post inversion tax savings on foreign source income provide a quantifiable,
although often distant future benefit. Inverting corporations disclose the estimates of this
benefit and rely on this benefit to seek the approval of their shareholders. By contrast, the
post-inversion tax savings on U.S. source income, which represent the most immediate
benefit of the transaction, are not quantified and relied upon in the disclosure documents.
There appear to be two reasons for this omission. First, it is a difficult and complex task
to measure savings inherent in future inter-company transactions. Second, the expected
tax saving are realized through the erosion of the U.S. tax base by employing tax
avoidance techniques, and therefore their disclosure might not be the best strategy for the
corporation wishing to protect its potential post-inversion tax savings.

71

See Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 97.

72

The competitive disadvantage faced by U.S. companies was brought to broad public attention
as a result of the inversion debate. For a an overview of the competitiveness issue see Joint
Committee of Taxation Report, The U.S. International Tax Rules: Background and Selected
Issues Relating to The Competitiveness of U.S. Businesses Abroad, JCX-68-03 (July 14, 2003)
(hereinafter, the “JCT Report on U.S. Competitiveness”). The competitiveness argument is
addressed in the conclusion of this article, text at note 247, infra.
73

A proposal for the reform of the earning stripping rules, IRC § 163(j), is in advanced stage if
legislative consideration. See the Administration Year 2004 Budget Proposal.
74

The post inversion tax savings on foreign source income may be a result of avoiding
repatriation taxes or of avoiding the interest expense allocation rules. These are discussed below.
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Earlier inversion transaction generally focused on the first benefit of the
transaction, avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign income.75 Subsequently it became clear that
“notwithstanding the longer-term competitive benefits related to the tax treatment of
future foreign operations or foreign acquisitions, the decision to enter into the inversion
may be dependent in many cases on the immediate expected reduction in U.S. tax on
income from U.S. operations”.76 Indeed, it has been argued that inversions would
continue to be carried out even in the absence of potential savings on foreign source
income.77 In short, the post inversion reduction of tax on U.S. source income seems to be
more important than the corporate disclosures suggest, and even when not emphasized
therein, it may have a significant market effect.
Post inversion reduction of tax on foreign source income is a future benefit. Even
the tax savings with respect to income on existing foreign operations held by the U.S.
parent become available only when those foreign operations are removed from the U.S.
holding company’s reach. This often occurs – as previously described – as a second
step, concomitantly with or subsequently to the stock inversion, and it may result in tax
costs at the corporate level. Tax savings with respect to income on future foreign
operations is likely to be realized without additional tax costs, as new foreign subsidiaries
will be held from their inception by a non-U.S. brother or sister corporation. By contrast,
tax savings on the U.S. source income of the inverted corporation are immediate. The
share inversion transaction is sufficient, in and of itself, to create a corporate structure in
which inter-company transactions may be undertaken to reduce the U.S. tax base.
Empirical analysis of the share price changes associated with announcement of
corporate inversions may shed some light on the reasons that motivate inverting
corporations. One economic study78 of corporate inversion performed a detailed

75

See NYSBA Report at 134. Notice 94-46 appeared to focus on the domestic corporation’s
removal of its foreign earnings from application of the anti-deferral rules of Subpart F and the
NYSBA Report on Notice 94-46 focused on tax avoidance relating to “outbound investment”.

76

Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 66.

77

See R. S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 93 Tax Notes
1793 (2002).
78

See Desai & Hines, op. cit. supra note 15.
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empirical analysis of share price changes associated with the inversion announcement -as well as the subsequent announcement to abandon the inversion plan -- of Stanley
Works.79 The study showed that the market reacted with a nearly $200 million increase
in value to the inversion announcement, in which Stanley Works estimated thatpost
inversion tax savings on foreign source income were likely to be in the $53-$83 million
range.80 It is likely that the market reaction factored in the expectation that Stanley Works
would realize a substantial post inversion tax saving on its U.S. source income in addition
to the expected savings on its foreign source income.

B.

Post inversion tax savings on foreign source income.

(1)

The tax objectives.
The outbound corporate inversion changes the U.S. based multinational company

into a foreign based multinational. This, in turn, creates the framework for (generally
taxable) transactions that carry out the removal of foreign assets and foreign business
activity from the existing U.S. corporate structure, thereby effectively eliminating U.S.
taxes on any income they generate. Similarly, the inversion creates a corporate structure
in which subsequently acquired assets and activities that generate foreign income can be
located in the corporate structure outside the ambit of U.S. taxing jurisdiction. In
principle, this is the basic consequence of an outbound corporate inversion on the
inverting corporation’s foreign source income.81

79

Stanley Works announced its intention to expatriate on February 8, 2002. On the date of the
announcement, the market value of Stanley’s equity increased by $199 million. Proposed
legislation to limit expatriations was announced on April 11, 2002. On May 10, 2002, a
shareholder vote on expatriation passed with a narrow majority, but was challenged by the
Connecticut Attorney General. On that date the market value of Stanley declined by $252 million.
See Desai & Hines op. cit supra.note 15 at 423.
80

In its February 8 inversion announcement, Stanley Works disclosed that it expected a
reduction of effective tax rate from the pre-inversion 35% to 22-23%. Id at 425-427.

81

An analysis of the size and structure of inverting corporations may lead to the conclusion that
post inversion tax savings on foreign source income is an important factor of the decision to
invert The probability that a firm will invert increases with firm size and with the share of firm
assets located abroad. Heavily leveraged firms are the most likely to expatriate, as are those
operating in low–tax foreign countries. Since the U.S. system of taxing the worldwide incomes of
American companies is particularly costly for firms with sizable interest expenses, as well as
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However, despite this general rule, the foreign tax exposure of a U.S. based
multinational is a considerably more complex issue. The United States assertion of taxing
jurisdiction over the worldwide (including foreign) income of U.S. companies is coupled
with important tax policy objectives. One important objective is thatexcessive tax
burdens not discourage U.S. corporations from optimizing their globaleconomic
performance through foreign active investment. A competing objective, however, is that
U.S. corporations should not be encouraged to locate their active investments in low tax
foreign jurisdictions for primarily tax saving objectives.
Different policies apply to income realized from passive investment, which is
highly mobile and has little or no connection with the underlying local economic activity.
The incentive to hold and reinvest passive income in low tax jurisdictions is great, and it
has little connection – apart from tax savings – with optimizing the global economic
performance of the company. Therefore, protection of theU.S. tax base is warranted by
recourse to an anti- deferral regime – of a complexity matched by the complexity of the
underlying transactions – thatimposes current taxation on certain types of passive income
realized abroad by U.S. persons.82
Implementation of these different policies results in different tax treatment for
active business income as opposed to passive income subject to the various deferral
regimes. Accordingly the pre-inversion foreign income of a U.S. based multinational
corporation that is effectively subject to U.S. taxation -- and thatmay therefore be
removed through inversion -- includes (i) income from active business activities, subject
to residual U.S. tax only upon repatriation, and (ii) subpart F income currently subject to
inclusion and residual U.S. tax.

(2)

General principles: The U.S. worldwide tax system and the operation of Subpart F

firms facing low foreign tax rates, this behavior is consistent with allocation rules playing an
important role in the decision to give up U.S. identity. Desai & Hines, op. cit. supra note 15 at
427-430.
82

The anti-deferral rules target, in principle, passive income. However, technically their reach is
broader. This is considered below in the detailed discussion of passive/Subpart F income, text at
note 88.
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Analysis of the principles that underlie U.S. taxing jurisdiction is essential for an
understanding of the motivations of a decision to invert. These principles, as well as the
technical rules that purport to implement them, have frequently been questioned by tax
scholars and practitioners in the course of the inversion debate. It has been argued that
the policies supporting U.S. taxing jurisdiction of the worldwide income of U.S. based
multinationals unduly discriminate against these corporations. Alternatively, while the
policies may be sound, the technical rules that implement them undermine their
objectives and place U.S. based multinationals at a competitive disadvantage.
The United States has a worldwide tax system.83 Domestic corporations generally
are taxed on all income, whether derived in the United States or abroad. Income earned
from non-U.S. operations of foreign corporate subsidiaries of a domestic parent
corporation is generally subject to U.S. tax only when distributed as a dividend to the
domestic corporation. The U.S. income tax on such income is thus deferred until the
repatriation. 84 The possibility of deferring taxes on income earned abroad until
repatriation confers a valuable benefit on U.S. based multinationals with operations in
low-tax foreign jurisdictions.85 However, deferral is not without limitations: U.S. antideferral rules may caus e the domestic parent corporation to be taxable on a current basis
in the United States with respect to certain categories of passive or highly mobile income
earned by its foreign subsidiaries, regardless of whether the income has been distributed

83

About one half of the OECD countries use a worldwide tax system. M. J. Graetz & P. W.
Oostehuis, Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Companies, 54 National
Tax Journal 771 (2001).
84

As an example of the benefits offered through consider the case of an American corporation, P,
with a foreign subsidiary, S, that earns $1,000 in a country with a 25 percent income tax rate. S
will pay taxes of $250 to the foreign country ($1,000 x 25%). Assume that S remits $400 in
dividends to P and retains the remaining $350 ($1,000 - $250 taxes and $400 dividends) to
reinvest in its own, foreign, operations. P must pay U.S. taxes on the $350 of dividends it
receives, and is eligible to claim a foreign tax credit for the foreign income taxes paid by S on the
$350. However P does not pay U.S. taxes on any part of the $350 earned abroad and retained by
S. However, if S were to distribute a dividend of $350 to P the following year, P would then be
required to pay U.S. tax – again subject to foreign tax credit-- on that amount.
85

The repatriation of earnings of U.S. multinationals from low tax jurisdictions is very low in the
early years of operations in the country. See J. Buckley & A. Davis, The ETI / Corporate
Inversion Debate: Will Myths Prevail”, 27 Tax Notes Int’l 443, 446-47 (July 27, 2002).
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as a dividend to the domestic parent corporation. The anti-deferral regime that has a
direct impact on the operation of U.S. based multinationalsis the controlled foreign
corporation rules of subpart F which causes certain income earned through their foreign
subsidiaries to be currently taxable.86 A foreign tax credit generally is available to offset - in whole or in part -- the U.S. tax payable on foreign-source income, whether such
income is earned directly by the domestic corporation, repatriated as an actual dividend,
or included under one of the anti-deferral regimes.87
Subpart F,88 applicable to controlled foreign corporations and their shareholders,
is the main anti-deferral regime of relevance to a U.S.-based multinational corporate
group. A controlled foreign corporation is generally defined as any foreign corporation in
which U.S. persons own --directly, indirectly, or constructively-- more than 50 percent of
the corporation’s stock, measured by vote or value,89 considering for this purpose only
those U.S. persons that own at least 10 percent of the stock.90 Under the subpart F rules,
the United States generally taxes the U.S. 10-percent shareholders of a controlled foreign
corporation on their pro rata shares of certain income of the controlled foreign
corporation (referred to as “subpart F income”), without regard to whether the income is
distributed to them.91
Subpart F income generally includes passive income and other income that is
readily movable from one taxing jurisdiction to another.92 It includes foreign base
company income, insurance income, and certain income relating to international boycotts
and other violations of public policy. Foreign base company income, in turn, consists of

86

IRC §§ 951-964.

87

IRC §§ 901- 902, § 960.

88

IRC §§ 951-964.

89

IRC § 957.

90

Measured by vote only. See IRC § 951(b). Stock ownership is determined applying the
constructive ownership rules of IRC § 958.
91

IRC 951(a).

92

See JCT Report on U.S. Competitiveness.
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foreign personal holding company income, which includes passive income (e.g.,
dividends, interest, rents, and royalties), as well as a number of categories of non-passive
income, including foreign base company sales income, foreign base company services
income, foreign base company shipping income and foreign base company oil-related
income.
To the extent that subpart F includes active income, as noted above93 it has the
effect of taxing non-repatriated active foreign income realized by U.S. corporations
abroad, a result that appears to be contrary to the legislative intent of permitting deferral
of taxation on active income until its repatriation.94 The inversion debate focused
attention on and criticized the reach of the anti-deferral regime over certain forms of
active income.95 This criticism applies particularly with respect to foreign base company
sales and service income,96 which are targeted by the anti-deferral rules on the rationale
that tax considerations, rather than operational reasons, determine the corporate
structure.97 In this instance, the anti-deferral rules are aimed at sales and service income
realized through a foreign subsidiary that does not have sufficient ties to its country of
organization (likely a low tax jurisdiction) and that arguably is being used simply to keep
the income out of the United States. However, while these corporate structures may have
the effect of reducing or delaying the ultimate U.S. tax exposure of the parent on

93

The Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 5 singled out shipping in support of the criticisms leveled
against the anti deferral regime in the context of outbound corporate inversions.
94

See JTC Report on U.S. Competitiveness.

95

Legislative proposals for excluding, with some exceptions, related party sales and service
income from the subpart F regime are pending. See e.g. H.R. 2896.

96

Income from sales of goods by a foreign corporation located in a foreign country that is
neither the origin nor destination of the goods is subpart F income if the goods are either
purchased from or sold to a related party. Similarly, income from services performed for or on
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repatriated foreign earnings, there are operational reasons for this type of structuring in an
increasingly global marketplace, and they are increasingly common..
The U.S. parent corporation (in the absence of an inversion) is treated as having
received a current distribution of the subpart F income of its controlled foreign
corporations. In addition, the U.S. parent corporation is required to include currently in
income for U.S. tax purposes its pro rata shares of the foreign controlled corporations’
earnings invested in U.S. property.

(3)

Operation of the foreign tax credit.
The United States generally provides a credit against U.S. income taxes for

foreign income taxes paid or accrued.98 In the case of foreign income taxes paid or
accrued by a foreign subsidiary, a U.S. parent corporation is generally entitled to a
“deemed paid” credit for such taxes when it receives an actual or deemed distribution of
the underlying earnings from the foreign subsidiary.99 The FTC serves the purpose of
mitigating double taxation of foreign-source income without offsetting the U.S. tax on
U.S.-source income.100 Accordingly the FTC has two main constraints, namely (i) it is
limited to the amount of the U.S. income tax liability on the taxpayer’s foreign source
income, and (ii) the taxpayer’s foreign source income is determined according to
principles of U.S. tax law, notably allocation of certain expenses.
Since the foreign tax credit is intended to alleviate international double taxation,
and not to reduce U.S. income taxes otherwise payable on worldwide income, the foreign
tax credit is limited to the amount of the U.S. tax liability on foreign–source income.101
When the taxpayer’s foreign tax payments exceed the U.S. tax liabilities applicable to
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IRC § 901.
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IRC §§ 902, 960.
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IRC §§ 901, 904.
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For example, a U.S. corporation with $1,000 of foreign income that faces a U.S. tax rate of 35
percent has a foreign tax credit limit of $350 (35 percent of $1,000). If the corporation pays
foreign income taxes of less than $350, it will be entitled to claim foreign tax credits for the entire
amount of its foreign taxes paid. However, if the corporation pays, for example, $400 of foreign
taxes, it will be permitted to claim no more than $350 of foreign tax credit.
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their foreign incomes the taxpayer is deemed to have “excess foreign tax credits.”
Taxpayers whose foreign tax payments are smaller than their foreign tax credit limits are
said to have “deficit foreign tax credits.” Taxpayers may use excess foreign tax credits in
one year to reduce their U.S. tax obligations on foreign source income in either of the two
previous years or in any of the following five years.102
The foreign tax credit limitation is applied separately to different types of foreignsource income, in order to reduce the extent to which excess foreign taxes paid in a hightax foreign jurisdiction can be “cross-credited” against the residual U.S. tax on low-taxed
foreign-source income. If a taxpayer pays foreign tax at an effective rate higher than the
U.S. effective rate on certain active income earned in a high-tax jurisdiction, and pays
little or no foreign tax on certain passive income earned in a low-tax jurisdiction, then the
earning of the untaxed or low-taxed passive income could expand the taxpayer’s ability
to claim a credit for the otherwise non-creditable excess foreign taxes paid to the high-tax
jurisdiction, by increasing the foreign tax credit limitation without increasing the amount
of foreign taxes paid. This type of cross-crediting is limited by rules that require the
computation of the foreign tax credit limitation on a category-by- category basis. Thus, the
passive income and the active income are placed into separate limitation categories called
“baskets” and the low taxed passive income is not allowed to increase the foreign tax
credit limitation applicable to the credits arising from the high-taxed active income.103
Present law provides nine separate baskets as a general matter, and effectively many
more in situations in which various special rules apply.
(4)

Further limitation on the FTC -- allocation of expenses.
The foreign tax credit, as noted above, is limited in amount to the U.S. tax

liability on the taxpayers foreign source income. An essential component of determining
the foreign source income for FTC calculation is the way in which it is affected by
expenses incurred in the United States. Firms with certain types of tax–deductible
expenses, particularly interest charges, expenditures on research and development, and
general administrative and overhead expenses, are required to allocate these expenses
102
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between domestic and foreign sources. The concept underlying this allocation process is
that such functions as raising investment capital, generating innovations, and managing
firm operations all contribute proportionately to themultinational’s worldwide income.
The intention of the U.S. allocation rules is to allow the tax benefit of the deductibility of
such expenses against domestic income only to that portion of the expenses
proportionately connected with producing income that is taxable by the United States.
U.S. tax rules attempt to implement this principle by assigning a certain fraction of
general expense items to domestic source, with the rest being assigned to foreign source,
based on complex and ever–changing formulas.
Interest expenses are generally the largest of these allocable expenditure of U.S.
based multinationals. Therefore the interest expense allocation rules are considered to be
the single most relevant factor which distorts the availability of FTC. Under present law,
interest expense that a U.S.-based multinational corporate group incurs in the United
States is allocated to U.S. and foreign sources based on the gross assets located in the
United States relative to those located abroad (measured either by basis or by fair market
value), without regard to any interest expense that foreign corporations within the group
may incur abroad.104 Thus, a U.S.-based multinational with a significant portion of its
assets overseas must allocate a significant portion of its U.S. interest expense against
foreign-source income, thereby reducing the foreign tax credit limitation and thus the
credits allowable. This allocation is required even if the foreign corporation undertakes
its own debt financing abroad. Further, the allocation applies despite the fact that the
interest expense incurred in by the United States parent is not deductible in computing the
taxable income of the foreign subsidiary for purposes of determining its actual tax
liability under applicable foreign law.
The expenses that are allocated to foreign source reduce the magnitude of foreign
income for the purpose of calculating the foreign tax credit limit. This is costly for firms
with excess foreign tax credits, and not costly for firms with deficit foreign tax credits.
Since interest expense is typically a firm’s largest allocable expense, firms with heavily–
taxed foreign income and considerable U.S. interest expenses are likely to incur
104
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significant costs associated with the inability to receive the full benefits of interest
expense deductions.
The availability of FTC may be reduced further by the taxpayer’s foreign losses.
If a taxpayer generates an overall foreign loss (“OFL”) for the year -- whether as the
result of business losses or expense allocations under U.S. tax rules -- it will not be able
to claim foreign tax credits for that year, since it will have no foreign-source income and
thus will have a foreign tax credit limitation of zero. Moreover, if the taxpayer does
generate foreign-source income in later years, some portion of such income will be
“recaptured,” or re-characterized as U.S.-source, thus reducing the foreign tax credit
limitation in later years.105 The rationale for OFL recapture is that the foreign-source
losses offset U.S.-source income in the year generated, thereby reducing the U.S. tax
collected with respect to U.S.-source income. The U.S. fisc would not be made whole
when the taxpayer subsequently earns foreign-source income if the U.S. taxes on such
income were completely offset by foreign tax credits.

C.

Post-inversion savings on U.S. source income.

(1)

The tax objectives.
Outbound corporate inversions are typically accompanied by earning stripping

and inter-company transactions designed to reduce the inverted corporation’s U.S. source
income.106 Earning stripping is achieved when USco the pre-inversion parent, and/or
U.S. subsidiaries of Bermudaco make deductible interest payments to Bermudaco.Inter company payments may take the form of management fees, licensing fees or royalties.
The inversion transaction also creates the opportunity to reduce U.S. taxable income by
moving assets and functions to an offshore parent or sister corporation. The inversion will
also create a structure in which – even in the absence of a transfer– the foreign affiliates
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See Treasury Inversion Report at ¶¶ 63-66; NYSBA Report at 135.
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will acquire the economic benefit of certain intangible assets developed and acquired by
the pre-inversion U.S. multinational, such as goodwill or corporate opportunity. 107
Interest payments are likely to be the most significant method of reducing post
inversion U.S. source income. Share inversion transactions, as earlier discussed, are often
accompanied by the creation of a new leverage structure or the extension of the existing
leverage structure, thereby taking optimal advantage of income stripping potential.108
Experience with inter-company advances in the domestic setting suggests that intra-group
debts may be informally documented and flexibly administered. Debt service, including
principal and interest payments, may not be enforced when group economic or business
circumstances render the payments burdensome or even inconvenient. Indeed, under
critical examination, the character of some of these debts as true debt (as well as the
reality of the interest payments thereon) may be questionable.109
From a worldwide tax standpoint, the newly-injected leverage is designed to be
tax efficient, based on at least three relevant factors: (1) deductibility of payments, (2)
avoiding or minimizing U.S. withholding tax, (3) avoiding or minimizing local country
income tax.110 Stripping income out of the United States through, e.g., foreign related
party debt will be effective only if the receipt of the interest payment generates less tax
107

NYSBA Report at 135. Income stripping may also occur where the U.S. corporation incurs
expenses such as general or administrative expenses for the benefit of its non-U.S. affiliates and
fails to charge the foreign corporation for services and assets it provides or where profitable
opportunities are shifted outside the U.S. or profit is shifted by transfer pricing or other intercompany arrangements. See, e.g., D.R. Hardy, Assignment of Corporate Opportunities: The
Migration of Intangibles, 100 Tax Notes 527 (July 28, 2003).
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Economists noted that inverting firms have lower leverage than their industry average before
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once a favorable tax structure is in place. C.B. Cloyd, L.F. Mills & C.D. Weaver, Firm Valuation
Effects of the Expatriation of U.S. Corporations to Tax Haven Countries, J. American Taxation
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corporate structure, see Hicks, op. cit. supra note 3 at 916-918.
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Treaty Interaction, 29 Tax Notes Int'l 1161 (Mar. 24, 2003); L. Sheppard, News Analysis:
Preventing Corporate Inversions,Part 3, Tax Notes (June 24, 2002).
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than the earnings otherwise would have been subject to. Interest payments made by a
U.S. corporation to its foreign affiliates, absent special treaty provisions, are generally
subject to a 30% withholding tax in the United States and they are also generally included
in the taxable income of the foreign recipient. Minimization or avoidance of foreign
taxation may be achieved by arranging for the outbound payments to be payable to a
recipient located in a tax haven jurisdiction with no corporate tax or a low corporate tax
rate. The net tax benefit will be the difference between the foreign tax imposed on the
interest income and the U.S. tax saved by obtaining the deduction forinterest expense.
The jurisdiction of choice in this respect is usually Bermuda, which has no corporate tax.
Minimization or avoidance of U.S. withholding tax may be achieved if the payee
(Bermudaco, the new parent corporation) takes advantage of special U.S. tax treaty
provisions by becoming ‘resident’ in a country like Barbados. This structure is facilitated
by the differences in the definition of residence; while the recipient corporation claims
residence for income tax purposes in one country (Bermuda) it invokes a different
residence for tax treaty purposes (Barbados).111

(2)

Earning stripping through foreign related party debt.
The potential to use foreign related party debt to reduce liability on U.S. source

income – thereby eroding the U.S. tax base – is of course not unique to inversion
transactions. Foreign based multinationals – whether created as such from their inception
or by inversion – can use inter-company loans to reduce U.S. source taxable income.
Concern about the effects of this technique prompted the enactment of IRC § 163(j) in
1989. The provision addresses these concerns by denying U.S. tax deductions for certain
interest expense paid by a corporation to a foreign related party. Section 163(j) applies
when the corporation’s debt–equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1 and its net interest expense
exceeds 50% of its adjusted taxable income (computed by adding back net interest
expense, depreciation, amortization and depletion and any net operating loss deduction).
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See Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 38.
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If the corporation exceeds these thresholds no deduction is allowed for interest in excess
of the 50% limit that is paid to a related party and that is not subject to U.S. tax.112
The earning stripping rules of § 163(j) permit a substantial amount of base
erosion before they kick in, since § 163(j) denies deduction of interest expense only for
corporations having a debt-equity ratio that exceeds 1.5 to 1. This threshold effectively
operates as a safe harbor for corporations with debt-equity ratios of 1.5 to 1 or lower.113
This safe harbor allows companies from less leveraged industries to put in place intercompany financing solely for tax reasons, without the threat of loss of the interest
deduction. The negative consequences of using a fixed debt-equity threshold under
current law may be eliminated by examining the appropriateness of U.S. interest expense
deductions in the context of the compared worldwide/U.S. leveraging of the multinational
corporation. In evaluating whether the U.S. corporation in question is disproportionately
leveraged relative to the corporate group it may be more appropriate to compare the debt
equity ration of the U.S. corporation to the debt equity ration of the worldwide corporate
group of which it is a part (determined without regard to inter-company indebtedness).114

(3)

Earning stripping through other inter-company transactions.
A share inversion transaction is often accompanied or immediately followed by a

transfer to the new foreign parent or a non-U.S. subsidiary of certain assets or subsidiary
companies previously held in the direct ownership chain of the pre-inversion U.S. parent.
This transfer may take the form of a dividend or a sale after the inversion is
consummated. In addition to the transfer of stock of foreign subsidiaries or intangible
and other assets, the inversion is likely to be accompanied by non-traceable transfers of
business opportunities, which carry with them future income potential that has thereby
112

IRC § 163(j)(2). Special rules apply in the case of interest paid to an unrelated party on debt
guaranteed by a related party -- IRC § 163(j)(6)(D) -- and in the case of interest that is subject to a
reduced rate of U.S. tax pursuant to an income tax treaty -- IRC § 163(j)(5)(B).
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Recent legislative proposals targeted a review of the §163(j) earning stripping rules along
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Disease?, 30 Tax Notes Int’l 483 (May 5, 2003).
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been removed from the reach of U.S. taxation. These cross border transfers of
subsidiaries and assets give rise to important valuation problems. A post inversion
reduction of tax liabilities on the inverted corporations’ U.S. source income may also be
achieved through payment of royalties or management fees. These ongoing transactions
similarly give rise to important income allocation issues. All these transfers put
considerable pressure on the application of transfer pricing and income allocation rules
designed to implement arm’s length standards in inter-company transactions. To the
extent that the arms’ length standard is not applied or enforced, the income shifting that
results can further significantly erode the U.S. tax base.115
One significant source of such payments, singled out by the Treasury Report on
corporate inversions, is associated with the outbound transfer of intangible assets, which
raise significant valuation issues.116 While transactions between related entities are
generally evaluated under an arm’s length standard pursuant to the transfer pricing rules
of § 482, the application of the standard is particularly difficult in the case of intangibles
for several reasons. First, it is difficult to determine whether a transfer of a non-legally
protected intangible, such as know how or business opportunity, has in fact occurred.
Second, the transaction that removes the asset from the reach of U.S. taxing jurisdiction
may be structured in different ways (e.g., fractional, territorial or time-limited licenses,
joint venture or strategic alliance agreements, etc.) which might require application of a
variety of transfer pricing treatments. The determination of the appropriate transfer price
is further complicated when less than all of the rights to the intangible asset are
transferred in the transaction.
An inter-company transaction may, in certain cases, fully comply with the arm’s
length principles of § 482 and still cause untaxed migration of value out of the taxing
jurisdiction. The inversion creates the opportunity to shift functions to the offshore
affiliate, and thereafter to impose an arm’s length deductible charge for them which may
include a profit element that will never be subject to U.S. tax.117 To address the issue of
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untaxed transfer of value through inter-company transactions it has been proposed that
post-inversion inter-company transactions be subject on a mandatory basis to § 482
scrutiny for a determined period.118

D.

Conclusion.
The pre-inversion U.S. based multinational is taxable upon repatriation on its

active income realized worldwide. By the application of the different anti-deferral
regimes the multinational is also currently taxed on its passive income. In both cases the
tax liability is supposed to be limited to an incremental tax that reflects the excess of the
U.S. tax over the tax imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. In consequence, there should be
no double taxation of the inverting corporation’s foreign source income, an objective
achieved through the operation of the complicated foreign tax credit mechanism.
However, these general rules are modified in actual implementation, often resulting in
effective double taxation of some portion of foreign source income. Moreover, the detail
and complexity of compliance with the U.S. foreign tax system impose high compliance
costs. Because the U.S. based multinational is taxed on its worldwide income, certain
income allocation / stripping techniques that are available to foreign corporations will not
be available to it.

IV.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Corporate Inversion

A.

Introduction
Generally, inversions are viewed by the initiating companies as being purely tax

based transactions, with no significant changes to corporate governance. The principal
sources of information on the details of inversion transactions – including their
underlying motivations – are the proxy statements issued by the inverting corporations,
seeking the required shareholder approval therefor, as filed under the proxy rules of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.119 These proxy statements have generally described
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the corporate governance changes to be brought about by the inversion – often including
considerable detail – but they have not highlighted the substantive and practical aspects
of corporate governance that might be changed as a result of the transaction.
The inversion proxy statements have generally assumed that post-inversion
shareholder rights and protections, usually based on English law, remain essentially
similar to those in place prior to the inversion. After an initial assertion to this effect, the
statements proceed to an item-by-item comparison of the texts of the relevant corporate
laws, comparing the law of the inverting corporation’s state of incorporation – usually
Delaware – with the law of the new residence jurisdiction, usually Bermuda. While these
disclosures appear to be technically complete, the general lack of publicknowledge by
U.S. shareholders of the operation of Bermuda law may leave those shareholders unaware
of important differences from Delaware or other relevant U.S. state corporate law.
Nevertheless, the one reported shareholder challenge to this form of disclosure under the
federal securities laws proved unsuccessful.121
It should be noted at the outset that none of the inversion proposals suggested that
the change of corporate domicile would yield substantial corporate, economic, market or
financial advantages apart from tax savings. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, it
would be very difficult to find any such advantages. The issues raised here, however, are
line through the SEC’s EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) system of
filing and retrieval, at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm
120

Rosenberg et al v. Nabors Industries, SD Texas, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14255. Civil action
brought by a dissatisfied shareholder of Nabors Industries, seeking a temporary restraining order
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Industries – containing a general statement to the effect that US and Bermuda law provide
substantially similar shareholder rights followed by a detailed comparison of the differences – did
not violate the federal securities laws.
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the other side of the coin. What, if any, are the corporate governance disadvantages of
the inversion. Until recently, there was a striking silence on this subject, but then an
important shareholder group opened the discussion.
That there are important differences between the corporate laws – and that
shareholders may not initially have been aware of them – is supported by the initiation of
efforts by major institutional investors, including public pension funds, to re-domesticate
several inverted companies. Beginning in 2001, a number of public pension funds began
a movement to require inverted corporations to reconsider their decisions to expatriate.122
The resulting disclosures revealed differences in corporate governance that had not
previously been fully examined in the initial tax-centered inversion debate. A number of
inverted corporations have since submitted re-domestication proposals to their
shareholders, and while the votes in these cases were negative, supportfor re domestication efforts appears to be on the increase.123
In the present post-Enron climate of heightened concern over corporate
accountability, the fact that an inversion changes the law applicable to corporate rights,
duties and responsibilities should not be neglected. What follows is an attempt, within the
limits of available sources on Bermuda law, to inquire in depth into the nature and
implications of these differences, which have so far escaped thoughtful study in the
inversion debate.

B.

Comparison of Corporate Laws
Bermuda has been the preferred destination of expatriating companies. In the

most recent wave of inversions all but three companies were re-incorporated in

122

The re-incorporation movement started through the effort of various California public pension
funds, eg. CALPERS (California Public Employees’ retirement System), CalSTRS (California
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Bermuda.124 Broadly, the core corporate governance issues center on whether and how
the change to Bermuda law of the traded top tier corporation affects the rights of
shareholders and the standards to which directors and officers will be held, in law and in
practice. The comparison must extend beyond the words of the relevant statutes. Of
central importance are the following factors:125
1. The breadth, clarity and coherence of the body of decisional law interpreting
and applying the statute.
2. The quality, experience, accessibility and efficiency of the courts.
3. The depth and breadth of practical experience with the corporate law and the
commentary thereon.
4. The character of the legal system upon which the law is based, including its
practices and traditions.
As will appear in the discussion that follows, comparison between Bermuda and
Delaware poses some difficulties. These are associated with the absence or unavailability
of case-law, court experience and commentary.

(1)

Delaware corporate law
Most of the inverting corporations were incorporated – at the top tier – in

Delaware. This is not surprising, since Delaware corporate law is characterized by a
modern, regularly revised corporate statute, a sophisticated, efficient and specialized
corporate judiciary, an extensive body of case-law precedent, and a multitude of practice
and scholarly commentaries. The Delaware General Corporation Law drafted is subject to
regular revision and amendment at the initiation of the Delaware Revision Commission.
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These factors, among others, are elaborated in two leading studies by Roberta Romano, the
first examining reincorporation decisions, and the second reevaluating long-standing view
concerning the basis for the initial choice of incorporation jurisdiction. See R. Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987); R. Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 225 (1985). More
recently, the subject has been revisited empirically in connection with incorporation decisions
upon initial public offerings. See R. Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1559 (2002).
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For the past half century this has generated many important changes in the statute, often
serving as the model for legislative revision in other states. The Delaware Revision
Commission and the Delaware legislature can be relied upon to propose and adopt
changes to the General Corporation Law to respond to current corporate developments
and maintain it at the cutting edge of corporate legislation.
Unlike most other common law jurisdictions, Delaware has maintained separate
courts for law and equity. This has particular relevance for corporate law, where the
Delaware Chancery court has emerged as the leading specialized corporate law court in
the United States. Delaware has followed the practice of appointing expert corporate
practitioners to this court and the court itself has adopted rules that assure very rapid
hearing and final determination of corporate cases.
By the mid 20th century Delaware had emerged as the dominant jurisdiction of
incorporation of major American corporations, and its dominance remains unchallenged.
As a result, a significant portion of American decisional and practical law and guidance
with respect to corporations is Delaware based. Commentaries, interpretations and
practical guidance on the meaning and operation of Delaware corporation law are in
abundance.126

(2)

Bermuda corporate law
While Delaware attracts corporations with its corporate law structure, Bermuda

attracts corporations with its lack of corporate income tax. Bermuda law is designed to
accommodate though its corporate law the influx of these corporations by granting them
the status of exempted company and automatic continuation.127 As of the end of year
2002 there were 12,000 exempted companies incorporated in Bermuda, most of which
had no assets, personnel, operations or substantial economic ties with Bermuda. Under
general conflict-of-laws principles, however, issues of corporate governance with respect
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Act 1981; for the continuation procedure see §132C Companies Act 1981.
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to these corporations would normally be decided on the basis of Bermuda corporate law.
This principle remains applicable even when – as is the likely and usual case -- the
relevant lawsuit is brought in a country other than Bermuda, and is based on act of
directors or officers unconnected with Bermuda. Thus, when a Delaware corporation
inverts, substituting a Bermuda corporation as the top tier, it abandons the previously
applicable law and practice of Delaware, substituting in their place the corporate law and
practice of Bermuda with respect to directors and officers.
The publicly available materials reveal a very sparse record of corporate litigation
and precedent in Bermuda. There is similarly very little published commentary on
Bermuda law or practice. Bermuda corporate law purports to be based on English law,
but there is a very limited body of case law that interprets the meaning and application of
the major aspects of Bermuda corporate law within the English law context.129 As a
result, at least to the outside observer, a comprehensive and detailed view of the meaning
and the operation of Bermuda corporate law is unobtainable.130 It is legitimate to ask,
therefore, whether Bermuda law can offer effective guidelines to corporate executives on
a day-to-day basis. Some sense of the opaqueness of the Bermuda law guidance will
emerge from the analysis below, which in most instances must be limited to a discussion
of the bare statutory language.

C.

Comparative analysis of director’s duties and liabilities
The duties of directors and officers under Delaware law are based principally on

case law, rather than statutory language. The Delaware courts have consistently held that
corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
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corporations upon whose boards they serve. The duty of care, embodied in the “business
judgment rule,” has been extensively interpreted by the courts. The duty of loyalty,
sweepingly described in the case law, 131 has been ameliorated by statutory procedures
allowing effectuation of interested transactions. Bermuda law includes a broad statutory
statement of these fiduciary obligations, and English company law – which Bermuda
practice is expected to follow -- similarly recognizes the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between directors and corporations. However, the absence of substantial
Bermuda precedent or English interpretive application, combined with certain statutory
differences between Delaware and Bermuda corporate law, have ledadvocates of re domestication to doubt that Bermuda directors and officers can be held to comparable
fiduciary duties applicable to their U.S. counterparts.

(1)

The duty of care
The first aspect of the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers is the duty of

care. Under Delaware law, the duty of care is subsumed under the business judgment
rule, which holds that the courts will not enjoin a board decision, or impose personal
liability upon members of the board based on that decision, provided the directors acted
in good faith, without self interest, and on the basis of reasonable consideration of the
reasonably available material information.132 This remains true even if the decision was
unwise, foolish, or even negligently undertaken.133 The rule acts as a presumption that
the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the belief that their action
was taken in the best interest of the corporation, in the absence of evidence of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing.134 Normally, the business judgment rule will result in substantial
deference to directors’ actions, even extending to negligence. However, the Delaware
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See, e.g., Guth v Loft, Inc., 5 A 2d. 503 (Del. 1939).
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See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Directors who pay no attention to corporate affairs will not be protected by the business
judgment rule. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Among the most widely-cited
cases of director liability following flagrant inattention is a New Jersey decision, Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
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Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
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Supreme Court has held that gross negligence is not protected by the business judgment
rule.135
Bermuda law similarly subjects the conduct of directors and officers to standards
of care and loyalty.136 The Bermuda standard appears as a statutory requirement under
the heading of “duty of care of officers,” but it contains two separate requirements. The
first – that an officer act “honestly, in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the
company” – will be further examined below. The second is the statutory standard of
care, that the officer “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances.”137 Unlike Delaware, with its
elaborated development of the business judgment rule, Bermuda’s statutory standard
appears to have been largely unexplored by the courts. In testing directorial conduct
under the second prong of the tests, the court is likely – based on English precedent – to
consider the specific skills and knowledge available to the director through his education
and experience.138 On its face, with this limited judicial gloss, the applicable standard
appears to be higher than Delaware’s, apparently an ordinary negligence test taking into
account the expertise of the director, as compared with a standard requiring gross
negligence for the imposition of director liability. This may suggest, on first reading,
that corporate inversion from Delaware to Bermuda results in an increase in the standard
of care applicable to officers and directors. However, there remains the open question –
135

Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), holding liable the directors for breaching
their duty of care in connection with approval of a “white knight” merger. Van Gorkum was
heavily commented on immediately after it was decided. See, e.g., B. Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkum, 41 Bus. Law. 1 (1985); Wander &
LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today’s Business Judgment
Rule, 42 Bus. Law. 29 (1986). The legislative response of Delaware to the risks of Van Gorkum
was Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7), discussed in text at note 164, infra.
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§ 2 Companies Act 1981, defines the term “officer” to include director.
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§ 97 Companies Act 1981.
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See Focus Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Hardy, et al (Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1992): In
determining whether a director has been guilty of negligence, “the court will take into account the
character of the business, the number of directors, the provisions of the articles, the normal course
of the management and practice of directors, the extent of their knowledge and experience and
any special circumstances which apply.” Citing In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company
Limited, 1 Ch. 407 (UK Chancery, 1925).
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not resolved in any substantial body of case law – how this standard will be applied in
fact. Moreover, the exculpatory provisions permitted by Bermuda law – which may be
adopted by inverting corporations – can render the apparently higher Bermuda standard
academic. Finally, the effective unavailability of shareholder derivative actions to
enforce the directors’ standard of care leaves shareholders of the Bermuda corporation
without effective remedies to protect their rights.139 These considerations are discussed
in subsequent sections of this article.

(2)

The duty of loyalty
The second aspect of the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers is the duty

of loyalty, which in general prohibits a director or officer from obtaining or retaining a
personal benefit from a corporate transaction. As implemented in both common law and
statutory rules, the duty of loyalty in Delaware (as in other states) has its principal
application in constraining corporate transactions in which one or more members of the
board are “interested.”
As a general rule a director is ''interested'' in a corporate decision when there are
factors weighing upon hisindependent exercise of judgment thatare inconsistent with
uncompromised loyalty to the corporate interests. Decisions in Delaware (and other
states) have interpreted “interest” to include – in appropriate fact situations – the
following circumstances: (i) a director has a personal financial stake in the decision
which is contrary to the corporate interests; (ii)a director contracts or transacts business
directly or indirectly with the corporation on whose board he serves; (iii) a director has a
material direct or indirect financial interest the entity thatis contracting or transacting
business with the corporation; (iv) a director receives a fee or other benefit in connection
with an otherwise arms-length corporate transaction;140 (v) a director serving on two
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See text at note 175, infra.
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The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Chancery Court holding that the director’s interest in
the challenged transaction must be sufficiently material to have breached his duty of loyalty and
“infected” the board’s decision. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). See
also Cinerama v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
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corporate boards has conflicting duties of loyalty with respect to a transaction between
the two corporations;141 (iv) board action is affected by structural bias.142
The earliest common law rule with respect to transactions involving the approval
of one or more interested directors was that the transactions were void ab initio, and later
cases softened this rule somewhat to render the transaction voidable at the option of the
corporation. The interested director could neither vote upon nor even be counted for
quorum purposes with respect to approval of the transaction.143 Delaware by statute has
abrogated these rules,144 and substituted a structure of disclosure and approval that allows
interested transactions to be entered into and to be binding upon all the parties thereto.146
The Delaware procedure, now adopted with some variations in most other states,
provides in substance three methods for approval of an interested directors’ transaction.
The transaction does not become void or voidable solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting which authorizes it if the material facts as to his
relationship or interest are disclosed to (or known by) the board, and the board in good
faith authorizes the transaction by a majority vote of the disinterested directors.147 The
transaction is similarly protected if the material facts are disclosed to (or known by) the
shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the transaction is specifically approved in good
faith by a vote of the shareholders.148 When neither of these procedures is followed, the
141

See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003)..
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The argument of structural bias flows is that in certain instances directors with no direct, or
even indirect, financial stake in a corporate decision may so identify with other directors who do
have such a stake that the independence of their judgment will be impaired. This argument has
been given little weight by the Delaware Supreme Court; see, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805 (Del. 1984).
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See Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation , 64 A.2d 581, 602 (Del. 1948).
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144(a).
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See Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation , 64 A.2d 581, 602 (Del. 1948).
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144.
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144(a)(1).
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144(a)(2). The statute is silent on whether shareholders who are
interested in the transaction may vote thereon. The Delaware Supreme Court has held, however,
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transaction may nevertheless stand if it “is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized,”149 a determination that in practice can only be made by the court following a
hearing.
By contrast with Delaware, the foundation of the duty of loyalty in Bermuda law
is statutory: an officer has a statutory duty to act honestly and in good faith, with a view
to the best interest of the company.150 The Companies Act 1981 lists certain types of
conduct that per se violate the officers’ obligations to act in good faith, including f ailure
to disclose on request compensation, benefits or a loan received from the company, as
well as omission to disclose an interest in any material contract or proposed contract, or
any material interest in any person that is a party to such a contract or proposed
contract.151 Materiality as it relates to contracts or proposed contracts is statutorily
defined,152 as is– by exclusion – materiality relating to ownership interests.153 A general
notice to the directors of a company disclosing the existence of the material interest is a
sufficient declaration of interest to satisfy the statutory standard.154
However, apart from requiring disclosure to the board, this detailed statutory
structure is silent. There is no requirement that the board approve or disapprove the
interested transaction, nor is there any indication of whether the interested director or
directors may be present during the deliberations or how the vote is to be counted.
Neither is there a procedure for shareholder vote – to deal, for example, with the situation
when a majority or all of the board are interested – or a standard (such as entire fairness)

that avoidance of a substantive hearing on fairness requires an affirmative vote of the
disinterested shareholders. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144(a)(3).
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§ 97(1) Companies Act 1981.
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§ 97(4) Companies Act 1981.
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§97(5)(b) “ … the materiality of that contract or proposed contract in relation to the business
of the company to which disclosure must be made.”
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§ 97(5)(c) Ownership or indirect control “of not more than 10% of the capital of a person
shall not be deemed material.”
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§ 97(5)(a) Companies Act 1981.
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for evaluating the validity of the transaction if the necessary disclosures or approvals are
not undertaken.
There are further unanswered questions. Conduct potentially violating the
director’s duty of loyalty under Delaware law might fall outside of the ambit of
Bermuda’s statutory disclosure requirement, but there remains uncertainty whether such
conduct might nevertheless violate the general standard requiring that the director act
honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.155 Such
conduct might include, for example, transactions that do not involve a material interest,
as statutorily defined, such as receipt of a special benefit incidental to an otherwise armslength corporate transaction with a third party, or conflicting loyalties involving a
transaction between two corporations on the board of which the interested director
serves.156 It is difficult, however, to predict the treatment of these acts, given the
unavailability of Bermuda precedent. Lack of transparency in this area is troublesome,
since the day-to-day carrying on of business occasionally requires corporate executives to
make decisions that probe their duty of loyalty.
Most particularly, the absence of procedures for approval of interested directors’
transactions leaves a gap – and an important practical issue – with respect to how to
assure the validity of certain desirable corporate transactions that might involve potential
fiduciary conflict. Is board knowledge alone sufficient to validate the transaction, or
must the board approve the transaction? What vote is required when, for example,
several directors are interested? Is a shareholder vote an option?
An interesting contrast is presented with respect to loans to corporate officers,
where the Bermuda rules158 appear on first reading to be more restrictive than those of
155

Note that the specific disclosure requirements of § 97(4) are preceded by the phrase “without
in any way limiting the generality of subsection (1),” which sets forth the general fiduciary duties
of officers.
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Provided, in both cases, that the interested director does not own directly or indirectly 10% of
the shares of the other contracting corporation. § 97(5)(c) Companies Act of 1981.
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§ 97(4) states that the listing of acts per se violating the obligation to act honestly and in good
faith is not intended to limit the generality of the rule that no such acts will be allowed
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See § 96 Companies Act of 1981.
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Delaware. Delaware law allows the grant of a loan or the guarantee of an obligation of
an officer or director “whenever, in the judgment of the directors, such loan, guarantee or
assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.”159 A decision on a
loan or guarantee of a loan to a corporate officer is not subject to any special approval
procedure. By contrast, Bermuda law prohibits loans to corporate officers without the
consent of the shareholders holding in the aggregate not less than 9/10 of the total voting
rights.160 There is an exception to this general rule,161 but Bermuda law appears on its
face to limit severely the recourse of officers to corporate funds by way of loans.162
The apparently more restrictive attitude of Bermuda law with respect to loans to
corporate officers and directors, has often been emphasized in inversion transaction proxy
statements. But with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to prohibit, in broad terms, the making of
loans to directors and officers of issuers registered under § 12 thereof.163 For all practical
purposes, this federal prohibition has preempted the field, prohibiting such loans for both
domestic and foreign registered corporations (with very limited exceptions), and
reversing any preexisting differences in applicable corporate law rules.

(3)

Exculpatory provisions in the articles or bylaws
An area of sharp contrast between Delaware and Bermuda is the extent to which

corporate law allows officers to be relieved by provisions in the articles or bylaws of
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Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 143.

160

§ 96 Companies Act 1981.
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The company may provide the executive with funds to meet expenditures incurred for the
purpose of the company or for the purpose of performing his duties as an officer of the company,
subject to the approval of the company’s general meeting. § 96(7) Companies Act 1981.
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Note that there may be questions with respect to this issue – including what transactions are
covered by the term “loan” – thatare not addressed by the statutory rules.
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See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, § 13(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k), making it
unlawful for any issuer, “directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to extend or
maintain credit . . . in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or
equivalent thereof) of that issuer.” Other relevant provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
are discussed at text at note 184, infra.
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liability for the violation of their duties. As a general rule, Delaware law permits the
adoption of a provision in the certificate of incorporation eliminating or limiting the
personal liability of a director to the corporations or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, subject to certain exceptions.
However, no such provision may eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any
breach of the duty of loyalty, for acts or omissions not in good faith or involving
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law or for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.164 A recent holding of the
Delaware Chancery Court importantly narrowed the protections of permitted exculpatory
provisions by determining that conscious and intentional disregard of their
responsibilities by directors constitutes either lack of good faith or intentional
misconduct.165
Bermuda corporate law is – on its face and in its application – very different. It
allows an officer to be relieved – through the by-laws or any contractual arrangement
with the company – from liability with respect to negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust.166 Only provisions limiting the liability of officers for conduct involving
fraud or dishonesty are voidunder the statutory terms .167 These statutoryprovisions have
been held to mean that by-laws may indemnify directors for willful default and willful
164

Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7). Limitation of director’s liabilities under Del. Gen. Corp. L. §
174 with respect to unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock purchase or redemption is
also disallowed.
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In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, Case No. 15452 (Del. Ch. May 28,
2003), distinguishing Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001), as holding that as a
matter of law, Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7) bars a claim only if there is only a due care claim,
and nothing else. See also McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), amended by 250 F.3d 997
(6th Cir. 2001), applying Delaware law, and noting – in rejecting dismissal based on the
corporation’s exculpatory clause – that reckless or intentional misconduct could constitute breach
of the duty of good faith. Cf. In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996), in which the court held that when a director makes a good faith attempt to
assure himself that the corporate information and reporting system is adequate, he will be deemed
to have upheld his duty of attention and care; and noting that continued failure to exercise
oversight responsibilities could result in director liability based on lack of good faith.
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neglect, as well as ordinary breach of duty. Claims against directors of Bermuda
companies having such by-laws must plead detailed particulars of the alleged willful
neglect or default to secure relief.168 It will therefore be difficult to obtain full recovery
against directors of such Bermuda companies who are sued in Bermuda.169 Such
contractual limitation of directors’ liability to preclude recovery even in the case of
willful default or willful neglect – despite the often relied on English origin of Bermuda
law – is not rooted in English law. The law of the United Kingdom is clearly to the
contrary: by statute, it makes illegal any provision intended to relieve directors of liability
for any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.170
This overall comparison of the substantive factors of corporate governance of
Delaware and Bermuda law reveals that officers must be guided in their relationship to
the corporation and its shareholders by a complex system of rules. Bermuda law contains
in certain respects detailed statutory guidance, which is unlikely, however, in the absence
or unavailability of interpretative case law to offer a basis for day-to-day decisions by
the officers of inverting corporations. It may be argued that this defect may be remedied
by consulting the corporation’s Bermuda counsel, a solution readily available to the
corporate executives, but potentially less to shareholders who wish to scrutinize executive
conduct. And, as shown, it is not clear on what basis even Bermuda counsel will give
advice. The reach of directors’ duties is vague and ambiguous under Bermuda law.
Moreover, as will be seen, judicial enforcement mechanisms available to shareholders are
incomplete. The statute itself contains very limited administrative enforcement
mechanisms. 171
Against this background, proxy materials and prospectuses describing the
corporate law consequences of inversion transactions may be misleading, even if in some
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senses they may be technically accurate. For example, by contrasting the duty of loyalty
under Delaware law (permissive) to the prohibition to grant loans to executives under
Bermuda law, the proxy material may convey the potentially misleading impression that
a more stringent duty of loyalty standard applies to executives under Bermuda law.172 In
fact, as we have seen, loans to corporate executives are transactions that receive special
treatment under both legal systems, independently of the general duty of loyalty. A
similarly misleading impression may be conveyed by reference to the intended
implementation of a permissive statutory provision, without a detailed description of its
operation. For example, a statement that the corporation after inversion will exempt
directors from liability to the fullest extent allowed by the applicable law –just as it did
prior to the inversion – implies that the same standards will apply to executive conduct
and its susceptibility to liability.173 However as we have seen, by contrast to the preinversion scenario, corporate executives may conceivably breach the duty of loyalty,
perform acts or omissions not in good faith or engage in any transaction from which they
derive an improper personal benefit and be more broadly exonerated from liability by the
by-laws. In particular, by contrast with Delaware law, the by-laws apparently may
exonerate them from liability, provided only that their acts do not amount to fraud or
dishonesty.174

(4)

Shareholders’ action for enforcement
The corollary of the substantive duties of corporate executives is the enforcement

of shareholder’s rights, which in the U.S. is primarily through derivative actions.
Shareholders of the inverted (now Bermuda) corporation may be able to pursue
either of two options for the enforcement of their rights post-inversion. The shareholders
may initiate a suit in Bermuda in the support of their rights, or alternatively they may
start proceedings in a U.S. court, and thereafter apply for the recognition and enforcement
of the U.S. judgment in Bermuda if that is necessary. A choice between these tactics is
172

See Xoma, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, supra note 37.
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See text at note 167, supra.
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important when the suit seeks a money judgment. In that case a dissatisfied shareholder
may prefer to start proceedings in the jurisdiction where the assets, out of which a
potential money judgment will be collected, are located.
Dissatisfied shareholders may find that it is not easy to initiate a derivative action
in a Bermuda court. There is no statutorily defined derivative action in Bermuda law, and
Bermuda courts are ordinarily expected to follow English precedent. English law follows
the rule in Foss v. Harbottle,175 which holds that – with limited exceptions – only the
company can initiate an action. These common-law exceptions permit the a derivative
action when (i) the complained act is ultra vires or illegal; (ii) the complained act
constitutes fraud against the minority, with the majority using its position to prevent
company action against wrongdoers: (iii) the shareholder approval for the act was below
the percentage required by the law for a valid approval, or (iv) the complained of act
violates the company’s memorandum or articles of association. These narrowly defined
exceptions do not on their face include any claimed violation of the directors’ duties of
care and loyalty. Interestingly, in the general absence of case law confirming the use of
English precedent on derivative actions in Bermuda courts, inversion prospectuses and
proxy statements discuss the possibility of initiating a derivative suit in conditional
language. They do not clarify what procedure, if any, an aggrieved shareholder should
follow to obtain enforcement of her rights, or the pre-litigation support of the corporation
for the enforcement of her rights.176 Of course, inverting corporations could in their bylaws provide alternative devices, such as arbitration, to facilitate the enforcement of
shareholder rights. Inverting corporations could also put in place a structure allowing
shareholders to alert the corporation, and possibly obtain its support, prior to recourse to
litigation, such as a litigation or oversight committee of the board of directors. Inverting
corporations do not follow any such practice and limit disclosure to the summary
175

Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461 (1843), discussed by the Bermuda Supreme Court in Stena
Finance BV, et al v. Sea Containers Ltd., et al, Civil Jurisdiction No. 178 of 1989, at pp. 25-28
(Bermuda Sup. Ct.).
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54

description of the English practice to initiate a derivative action likely to be followed by
Bermuda courts.
The probability that dissatisfied shareholders of inverted corporations would
attempt to enforce their rights through the Bermuda court system is low. Alternatively,
the common way to enforce shareholders rights is through an action brought in U.S.
courts, provided service of process can be effected.177 The litigation involving corporate
governance issues would require the court to apply Bermuda law as the governing
corporate law. Certain corporate governance issues, such as loans to executives, may also
involve the application of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Alternatively, if the litigation raises issues relating to the violation of the federal
securities laws, the court would apply U.S. law. Direct corporate actions against the
executives of corporations involved in the recent corporate scandals have been initiated
in U.S. courts.178 These particular proceedings are unlikely to involve any problem of
enforcement, since they are corporate actions directed against the individual executives
whose assets are probably located in the U.S. However, a U.S. judgment targeting the
Bermuda corporation itself or any of its officers without substantial U.S. presence and
U.S. assets may raise Bermuda enforcement problems.
There is no treaty between the United States and Bermuda governing the mutual
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Inverting corporations frequently emphasize
that in the absence of a treaty, Bermuda courts would enforce money judgments granted
by United States courts following the common-law rules on the enforcement of foreign
judgments. The common-law allows the recognition of a foreign in personam judgments
177

Several prospectuses, in the section headed “Risk Factors,” warned shareholders of inverting
corporations of the serious difficulties in starting proceedings in U.S. courts. It was stated that
service of process on or enforcement against the corporation, a foreign entity with possibly no
assets in the United States, would be difficult. See White Mountain Prospectus/Proxy Statement,
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residents of jurisdictions outside the United States. See White Mountain Prospectus/Proxy
Statement, id. Query whether inverting companies and their executives would not have sufficient
presence to warrant service of process. Clearly any uncertainty in this respect could be resolved
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provided that (i) the issuing court properly assumed jurisdiction and the judgment is not
(ii) obtained by fraud, (iii) contrary to public policy or (iv) converse to natural justice.179
The extent to which these rules may lead to denial of the enforcement of a U.S.
judgment is uncertain. First, the recognition of U.S. court decisions on corporate disputes
that involve the application of the federal securities laws may encounter obstacles on
public policy grounds. Certain remedies available under the U.S. federal securities laws
may not be enforced in Bermuda courts as contrary to public policy.180 Second, the
existence of two forums where disputes may potentially be litigated may result in
complexities that threaten the ultimate recognition or enforcement of the judgment in the
alternative forum. As an example, Bermuda courts may grant antisuit injunctions in
support of their jurisdiction, following English precedent.181 For example, an antisuit
injunction may be granted against proceedings started in the United States in violation of
an arbitration clause providing for Bermuda arbitration. If the U.S. litigation nevertheless
proceeds further and results in a final judgment,182 this judgment will not be recognized
or enforced in Bermuda, on the ground that it violates natural justice. This is not a
hypothetical scenario. Indeed, in an analogous case the Supreme Court of Bermuda has
held that a U.S. judgment granted in violation of a Bermuda antisuit order is not
enforceable in Bermuda.183
Perhaps the concurrent jurisdiction of U.S. and Bermuda court over disputes
centered on corporate governance issues may not lead to such drastic results in average
cases. Perhaps even in the face of general unavailability of derivative actions in Bermuda,
shareholders rights can be enforced. Nevertheless, it is likely in all these cases that the
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costs and complexities of enforcement of shareholder’s rights will increase considerably
as a result of the inversion.

D.

Conclusion
Proxy statements and prospectuses associated with inversions assert that

shareholders will continue to have fundamental rights and enforcement alternatives with
respect to the new parent corporation. We have seen that Bermuda law includes
prohibitions, limitations and protections that constrain the conduct of corporate officers
and directors; and we have seen, as well that there is a basis for shareholder enforcement
of these duties. Nevertheless, our detailed comparison reveals clearly one distinguishing
element of post-inversion corporate governance and shareholders’ right enforcement -uncertainty. Thus while executives of Bermuda corporations clearly have duties of care
and loyalty, the metes and bounds of those duties are, unlike those in Delaware, not made
clear by case-law practice or commentary. Further, while shareholders of inverting
corporations arguably continue to have the right to seek judicial enforcement of the duties
of directors and officers, this enforcement is also affected by Bermuda law ambiguity.
Finally, corporate transparency is impaired by the complexities involved in
accommodating to a different system of law. Directors and officers must face the
difficulty of adjusting their conduct to comply with the rules of a two different system.
Shareholders, in turn, must contend with the complexity of assessing and attempting to
enforce their rights under the possibly conflicting and inconsistent rules of the state law
of corporations in the U.S. (generally Delaware) and Bermuda company law.
While the change in applicable corporate law may affect standards of corporate
governance, federal securities laws continue to apply and thereby to regulate some
aspects of both corporate conduct and shareholders’ remedies. While these laws are
primarily focused on issues of corporate disclosure, recent amendments – most notably
some aspects the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – incorporate some components of
corporate governance.184 These would equally apply to inverted corporations.185
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See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-204) § 301(a) (Requirement that CEO and
CFO reimburse incentive and equity compensation if accounting restatement is required), §302
(CEO and CFO certification of annual and quarterly reports), § 402, amending Securities
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Nevertheless it is a fundamental principle of the federal securities laws that they are not
directed to the regulation of traditional, state law based areas of corporate governance or
to their remediation.186 Thus the central issues discussed above, the duties of directors
and officers and their enforcement, are not addressed by federal law.

V.

The legal and economic framework facilitates corporate inversions
Outbound corporate inversions would not be favored as a method to achieve tax

savings in the absence of a legal and economic framework that facilitates these
transactions. Certain factors that favor inversions, such as increased public acceptance of
inverted corporations, are the product of the development of market structures in the past
two decades. Other factors, including inadequate enforcement of measures designed to
halt certain types of tax motivated transactions, emerged as the recent wave of outbound
inversions accelerated. It is unlikely that inversions would have been possible without the
interaction of multiple factors, the most notable of which have been: (a) modest
transactional tax costs; (b) continued access to capital markets, continued market
acceptance and continued eligibility for government contracts after inversion; (c) special
decisional motivations on the corporate and shareholder level, including inadequate
emphasis on corporate governance changes; (d) non-enforcement of potential antiinversion measures, such as the business purpose doctrine and § 269; and (e) deficiencies
in the conceptual framework of the tax law for the taxation of multinationals. Tax
commentators have addressed the effects of some of these factors, although without
emphasis on their interaction. The impact and combined effects of these factors in
creating a pro-inversion tax and economic environment are detailed below, together with
a consideration of the major features of legislative proposals addressing these issues.

Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, § 13, 15 USC § 78m(k) (Prohibition of loans to directors and
officers of registered companies).
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With limited exceptions (e.g., the requirement for audit committee in § 301, which is limited
to listed companies), the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies – pursuant to § 2(7)
thereof – to all issuers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §12A.
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See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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A.

Transactional tax costs
The recent increase in inversion activity suggests that the transactional tax costs

presently imposed on corporate inversions are too low to constitute an effective
disincentive to this type of corporate restructuring.
As demonstrated earlier in this article, inversions are generally structured as stock
for stock exchanges accompanied -- or possibly followed by – transfers of stock and/or
operating assets to foreign affiliates designed to remove these assets from the ambit of the
CFC rules. Section 367(a) imposes a toll-charge on the transaction by taxing the
exchanging shareholder on the capital gain realized in the exchange of the stock.187 The
§ 367(a) toll charge appeared to be an effective deterrent immediately after its adoption,
and with some exceptions no outbound corporate restructuring occurred from the time of
its adoption until the most recent wave of inversions.188 As a result of several
developments, however, the resulting shareholder level tax has become much less
significant today than contemplated as of its enactment. Most importantly, stock prices
have fallen considerably in the past years.189 This is significant in the light of the trend in
shareholder turnover which indicates that shareholders are holding stock for shorter
periods of time, thereby reducing the level of built in capital gain.190 There has also been
a significant increase in shareholdings by entities that are either not subject to, orless
sensitive to, U.S. capital gains tax, including tax exempt entities and mutual funds.191
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IRC § 367(a) may, however, act as a deterrent to certain legitimate transactions while it
overlooks certain abusive transactions. See S.J. Thompson, Section 367: A ’Wimp’ for Inversions
and a ‘Bully’ For Real Cross-Border Acquisitions, 26 Tax Notes Int’l 587 (May 6, 2002).
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E.g. An exception was Triton Energy: inversion announced on 2/8/1996 and completed on
3/25/1996. See also NYSBA Report at 131.
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See Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 51, noting that the three most widely quoted indices of U.S.
corporate share prices, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard & Poor 500 Index, and the
Nasdaq Composite had dropped respectively approximately 20%, 30% and 70% from their all
time highs reached in 2000.
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NYSBA Report at 132.
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Both dividends and capital gains on stock investments of qualified pension funds and of nonprofit institutional investors are immune from current taxation. Also, mutual fund managers
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While there is no comprehensive listing of the percentage of tax exempt holders of stock
of inverted corporations, the available data suggests that the percentage of institutional
investors of inverting entities is generally high.192
These developments undermined the effectiveness of the § 367(a) capital gains
tax as a deterrent to outbound inversions. In addition, some tax planning techniques offer
the possibility for a further reduction of the shareholder level tax.193 Subsequent
transactions designed to remove the foreign subsidiaries from the CFC net, though
taxable, are individual transactions that allow the transferring corporation some planning
potential to time and structure the transaction so as to minimize its tax cost.194
As noted earlier, asset inversions are fully taxable at the corporate level, the
inverting corporation being treated as having sold all its assets to the resulting entity.
However, in a manner similar to tax planning for transactions thataccompany share
inversions, inverters may use strategic planning to time and structure the transaction to
obtainthe most tax efficient result. Xoma Corporatio n carried out this type of inversion
virtually tax-free,195 while White Mountain Insurance Group incurred relatively minimal
tax cost through the reorganization.196 Tax minimizing techniques are available when the

generally appear to be less sensitive to tax considerations, though their investors are liable to tax
on their allocable shares of income and capital gains.
192

E.g. PRXE Corporation -- 89%; Ingersoll-Rand -- 91%; Everest Reinsurance – 82%; Cooper
Industries – 76%; Fruit of the Loom – 57%; Noble Drilling – 88%; Nabors Industries – 87%;
Weatherford Int’l – 90%. Institutional ownership, as defined in the study providing this data,
refers to percentages held by banks, investment firms, insurance firms, college endowments and
13F money managers. Some of these investors are tax exempt, and others are subject to taxation.
See Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, op. cit. supra note 108, at
193

E.g. the exchangeable share technique, discussed in text at note 30, supra.
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Operating assets may be transferred in a § 351 transaction and qualify for the § 367(a)(3)
active foreign business exception. Sale of assets to foreign subsidiaries is available when the asset
has no substantial built in gain. On the potential available to structure these transactions in a taxefficient manner see Hicks, op. cit. supra note 3.
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The inversion took place when the corporation had substantial net operating losses, just prior
to the approval of a new drug developed by the corporation. See Xoma, Prospectus/Proxy
Statement, op. cit. supra note 37 at
196

The corporate level tax was estimated to be between $5 and $20 million. See White Mountain
Insurance, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, discussed in text at note 33, supra.
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inverting U.S. corporation has tax attributes, such as net operating losses and excess
foreign tax credits, that can offset a significant portion of the resulting U.S. tax. As
presently structured, the tax law allows the use of such corporate attributes to reduce
U.S. taxes by an inverting corporation.
In short, transactional tax costs as presently structured and applied have been
ineffective in deterring expatriating corporations.197 However, the potentialfunction of
transactional tax costs may be more extensive. In this connection, a central question
posed by inversion transactions is whether valuable assets have been removed from the
taxing jurisdiction of the U.S. without appropriate taxation thereof. The answer appears
to be affirmative, though no commentator to date has attempted a quantification of the
removed benefits. From the outset, the now foreign-based multinational is “in the
position of benefiting from the goodwill and going concern accumulated by the U.S.
company prior to the inversion.”198 In addition the foreign subsidiaries of the group are
in the position to benefit from corporate opportunities that attached to the pre-inversion
multinational by virtue of economic characteristics that likely developed in conjunction
to its original status as a U.S. corporation.199 The Treasury Report listed as an income
shifting device the opportunity that “the existing foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. group
are allowed to ‘wither away’ with the new business and growth opportunities directed to
the foreign subsidiaries of the new foreign parent”.200 Post-inversion inter-company
dealings, if not adequately monitored for compliance with the arm’s length standards,
may achieve a similar result.
It is essential that corporate expatriations be so taxed as to disallow tax free
removal of tangible and intangible property, including goodwill and corporate
opportunity, from U.S. taxing jurisdiction. Several proposals targeting inversions have
reflected on this problem, but none have suggested a comprehensive solution. One
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NYSBA Report at 131.
See, e.g., NYSBA Report at 139, noting specifically the benefit of using the corporate name.
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For an overview of this topic See D. R. Hardy Assignment of Corporate Opportunities; The
Migration of Intangibles, 100 Tax Notes 527 (July 28, 2003).
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Treasury Inversion Report at ¶ 80.
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possible approach is to view the inversion as a deemed liquidation of the U.S.
multinational followed by establishment and transfer of all asset to the foreign
multinational. However, deemed liquidation treatment would not provide the argument –
under present tax law – for imposing taxation on accumulated goodwill and corporate
opportunities transferred in the inversion. Moreover the taxation of the appreciation
inherent in the assets of the U.S. multinational could still be minimized through the use of
offsetting tax attributes. A further difficulty of the deemed liquidation argument is that
the inversion transaction -- specifically the share inversion -- does not of itself
accomplish the tax reducing transfers. It merely creates a structure for subsequent
carrying out of transactions that remove CFCs from U.S. taxing jurisdiction or that
reduce U.S. source income.
It has also been suggested that inverting companies should be disallowed the use
of offsetting tax attributes,201 which would result in imposing an inescapable tax cost on
the removal of tangible and intangible property from the U.S. taxing jurisdiction. Such a
measure could address asset inversions as well as the associated transactions
supplementing stock inversions, all of which have the effect of removing property from
the U.S. taxing jurisdiction. Included in these transactions would be contributions of
stock of the foreign subsidiaries to new foreign affiliates, as well as transfers of
intangibles designed to create the framework for inter-company licensing payments.202
However, transfers of corporate opportunities would nevertheless remain non-taxable,
since the tax law at this stage does not appear to have adequate means of dealing with
them.203
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E.g. S. 2119 known as Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore Act (the “REPO Bill”)
proposed that no offsetting tax attributes – such as net operating losses and other credits – could
be applied to reduce tax on gain realized by the domestic corporation on the inversion transaction
or on subsequent transfer of stock or property to related foreign corporations.
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Specific follow-on inter-company transactions, including inter-company sales of assets fall
within the reach of § 482. Inversion studies and legislative proposals suggest that a mandatory
post-inversion § 482 audit would be appropriate to monitor post-inversion migration of value.
See e.g., NYSBA Report at 140; the REPO Bill, supra.
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See Hardy, op. cit. supra note 199, addressing different ways of taxing transfers of corporate
opportunities.
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B.

Continued access to capital markets
Inverted corporations enjoy the same access to U.S. capital markets as they did

prior to the inversion; their stock continues to be listed on the NYSE and the S&P 500,
securing access to investors, including indexinvestors.

204

Offshore companies have

similarly experienced increased market acceptance in the past decade and “appear not to
be regarded by capital markets with suspicion, as they once were.”205 Investment bankers
are increasingly supportive of transactions involving stock of offshore corporations.206
There is a strong basis for arguing that the access to the U.S. capital markets held
by inverted corporations is at least in part a product of their previous U.S. corporate
status. Many inverting corporations started their operations as small U.S. businesses
decades earlier, even at the end of the 19th century,207 and grew along with growth in the
U.S. economy. It would be unreasonable to suggest that this factor alone should warrant
continued subjection to U.S. taxation irrespective of subsequent changes in their
structures and operations. However, it is at least arguable that those corporations received
an asset – a value not then available to foreign corporations either in foreign or in U.S.
capital markets – in their original opportunity to raise and grow capital in the U.S.
markets, a value they retain today in their existing capital structure. And if there is such
an asset, there may be justification for U.S. taxation, either on its transfer through
inversion or by some other mechanism.
The inversion debate highlighted the fact that start-up companies can avoid the
application of burdensome U.S. international tax by incorporating in a foreign
jurisdiction. These corporations often benefit, nevertheless, from the U.S. capital market
structure, but not in the same way as inverting corporations. It is not likely, for
example, thata start-up Bermuda corporation will raise any significant portion of its
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See discussion at text at note 116, supra.
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NYSBA Report at 132.
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See J. R. Zavoli, High Tech Firms Going Public: Benefits of Listing as a Foreign Issuer in
U.S. Capital Markets, 10 J. Int’l Taxation 7 (1999).
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E.g Stanley Works claims a corporate history of 160 years See www.stanleyworks.com.
Ingersoll-Rand claims a corporate history dating back to 1871. See www.irco.com.
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capital in the jurisdiction of its incorporation.208 Capital would likely be raised through
an IPO in the United States, facilitated by increased acceptance of foreign incorporated
companies by the U.S. investment banking community within recent years. Still, it is not
clear that a newly-formed company incorporated in Bermuda would have – at the outset –
equivalent investor acceptance as a Delaware corporation. One clear evidence of this is
that the standards that would apply to a Bermuda entity in obtaining a NYSE listing are
higher than those applicable to U.S. corporations,209 including inverting companies.
Thus, the preferred market status secured by inverting corporations by virtue of their
initial U.S. status would be available to foreign start-ups only by incurring higher
’costs’.210
Inversion similarly leaves unaffected the eligibility of the inverted corporation to
obtain U.S. or state government contracts.211 It is at least arguable that companies
outside the taxing jurisdiction of the United States (which might include not only inverted
corporations but also those initially incorporated outside the U.S.) having excluded
themselves from the tax costs of corporate “citizens,” should be restricted in their
eligibility to compete for contracts with the government. The continued eligibility of
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The sources of investment capital in Bermuda are limited. Only two of the companies that
underwent inversion transactions were listed on the BSE [Tyco and Global Crossing], which is a
fully electronic market, and both were listed as well on the NYSE. As previously indicated, there
is no Bermuda index system analogous to S&P 500.
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Section 103.01 of the Listed Company Manual, NYSE Listing Rules.
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The higher costs of market access refer to the fact that a foreign corporation must meet higher
financial standards -- measured by earnings, operating cash flow, global marker capitalization,
etc. -- to be listed on the NYSE.
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A General Accounting Office report, released on Oct. 2, 2002, showed that four of the top 100
federal contactors that are publicly traded corporations are incorporated in a tax haven country.
In 2001 the federal government awarded $2.7 billion in federal contracts (roughly 2.6% of all
contracts) to the following four companies: McDermott International, Inc. ($ 1.885 Billion);
Foster Wheeler, Ltd. ($286.3 million); Accenture Ltd. ($279 million); Tyco International Ltd.
($206.4 million). BNA, Daily tax Report, Oct. 3, 2002
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inverted multinationals for governmental contracts, although widely criticized, has not
yet been statutorily addressed.212

C.

Special motivating factors for the decision to invert
The corporate inversion, as the earlier discussion demonstrates, substantially

affects corporate governance, most importantly by the introduction of uncertainty and
ambiguity concerning the duties and liabilities of corporate officers and directors.
Bermuda law, which is frequently the governing corporate law after the inversion, does
not provide guidance for corporate acts of the same clarity and comprehensiveness as
Delaware law. Accordingly, the new governing corporate law may not provide adequate
guidance for shareholders to monitor compliance with director’s duties and may not offer
satisfactory means of enforcement. This is especially relevant in the economic climate of
the past few years, when large scale corporate frauds have focused concentrated
governmental and public attention on the accountability of corporate executives.
Corporate inversions are based, of course, on the affirmative vote of the
shareholders, who may wish to exchange a degree of transparency and certainty in the
accountability of corporate executives for tax benefits.213 Absent overriding public
policy considerations, the shareholder decision should not be subject to question,
provided that it reflects an informed choice. The discussion earlier in this article raises,
however, serious questions with respect to the informed nature of the shareholder
inversion votes. In the most recent wave of corporate inversions the corporate proxy
statements appeared to be the exclusive source of information on changes in corporate
governance.214
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Lawmakers have recently proposed that inverting firms should be ineligible to bid for
contracts from the Department of Homeland Security’s $29 billion budget. See House
Appropriation Committee amendment, reported on www.tax-news.com (June 25, 2003).
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Shareholder approval percentages of inversions are very high (generally in the 85%-95%
range). See C.B. Cloyd, L.F. Mills & C.D. Weaver, Market Nonreaction to Inversions, 98 Tax
Notes 259 (Jan. 13, 2003) (summary report of Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, op. cit. supra note 108).
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The NYSBA Report and the Treasury Inversion Report, for example, do not discuss the
consequences of the corporate law change.
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Actions undertaken to raise public awareness on the corporate governance
changes inherent in the transaction were notably absent from the inversion debate, with
the exception of a movement initiated by several California pension funds seeking the redomestication of several inverting corporations. Shareholder awareness of the effects of
post-inversion corporate governance changes could affect the expatriation decisions.215
The Stanley Works inversion plan attracted a narrowly positive shareholder vote,
following increasing negative public pressure, and the company abandoned the plan after
it was challenged by the Connecticut Attorney General. Ingersoll Rand shareholders
recently showed a high, although insufficient, support in favor of re-domestication.216 In
this context, the importance of public awareness of corporate governance changes caused
by the inversion cannot be sufficiently emphasized.
The initiative to invert originates from the multinational’s management and is
subject to shareholder approval, and it should therefore be expected thatmanagement will
advance an inversion proposal after careful analysis and with the intention to maximize
shareholder value. Recent corporate law scholarship suggests thatthe decision to change
the jurisdiction of incorporation may be based on different considerations and incentives
from those that apply in the initial choice of the place of incorporation. U.S. corporations
generally prefer to incorporate in Delaware for initial public offering, and it appears that
the choice of Delaware law adds measurable share value. 217

Subsequent change of the

jurisdiction of incorporation (as by inversion) – resulting in the loss of the advantages of
Delaware corporate law – may reduce shareholder value, but it is not clear to what extent
the reincorporation decision is motivated by maximizing shareholder value. The
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At least two inverting corporations, McDermott International and Tyco, announced an
expatriation review process in response to the Calper’s initiative.
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Ingersoll Rand vote on re-domestication was supported by 45% of the shareholders. This is in
sharp contrast with the original 89% vote in favor of inversion.
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See R. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. Fin. Econ.525, 532 (2001)
(Finding, based on empirical study, measurably higher value for Delaware corporations than for
those incorporated in other states); R. Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77
N.Y.U. L.. Rev. 1559, 1603-1604 (2002) (Concluding that “Delaware attracted the most firms
and appears to have offered valuable legal rules and to be relatively unlikely to entrench
incumbent managers. Delaware IPO firms were also more widely held, consistent with theories
that Delaware improves governance and reduces agency costs in public firms.”).
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decisions to re-incorporate may place less emphasis on shareholder value maximization
than the pre-IPO choice of incorporation.
With respect to outbound corporate inversions, the question is whether the loss of
the framework of Delaware corporate law may have any negative effect on shareholder
value, and to what extent this is considered by corporate executives proposing the
inversion. Economic studies have not yet explored this question and, indeed, they have
not reached a consensus on the effects of inversions on shareholder wealth and share
prices.218
Moreover, management may have different incentives for a decision to expatriate
than the shareholders. The structure of the company’s compensation plans or the
inversion itself may result in management capturing a considerable portion of the future
tax savings.219 Furthermore, to the extent that share prices react positively to the
inversion, managers may exercise their stock options, diluting further share values for
existing shareholders.220

D.

Imperfect enforcement of measures designed to halt inversion type transactions
Corporate expatriations are carried out as reorganizations, and in order to be

respected for tax purposes, must be satisfy the requirement of a business purpose. The
requirement that the transaction be based on business reasons is contained in the
judicially developed and statutorily confirmed business purpose doctrine. A separate
statutory rule, § 269 of the Internal Revenue Code, provides for the denial of benefits and
218

It has been argued that the in
version announcement does not cause a positive share price
reaction. See Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, op.cit supra note 108 at 14-20. This study suggests among
other possibilities that much of the tax saving may be captured by top management rather than the
shareholders, and this as well as the loss of shareholder rights to take legal actions in the offshore
jurisdiction may have negative valuation implication for the shares of inverting firms. Id. at 22.
But there is no consensus about share prices reacting negatively to inversions. See Hines &
Desai, op. cit. supra note 15 at 430 – 436, finding mixed stock price reactions to inversion plan
announcements, but concluding (based on their empirical data) that share prices are “consistent
with rational tax planning on the part of inverting firms and managers maximizing shareholder
wealth rather than share prices.”
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For example, the compensation plans for Nabors Industries gave the top two executives 8% of
the company’s cash flows. Nabors Industries, Proxy Statement/Prospectus, op. cit. supra note 21.
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See Cloyd, Mills & Weaver op.cit supra note 108 at 22.
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deductions with respect to transfers of assets unless the business reasons therefore
outweigh the tax motivations. There is considerable reason to question whether outbound
corporate inversions satisfy these requirements. Indeed the question appears to be more
fundamental, as the NYSBA Report articulates: whether inversions are shams.221
The inversion changes dramatically the tax liability of the inverted multinational
without altering in substance any of the factors relevant to its operation. The location of
economic operations and business practices are not affected, and the place where the
operational decisions are taken, the corporate headquarters, remain unchanged. The
inversion proxy statements invariably emphasize, when seeking shareholder consent, that
the inversion does not produce alterations in the operational structure of the inverted
corporation. The inverted company maintains its attractiveness to investors since it has
the same access to the U.S. capital markets and its operation – including in a limited way
corporate governance – remains subject to the federal securities laws. Thus, despite the
lack of substantive business changes the entire tax structure of the inverted multinational
changes. The inverted corporation achieves foreign status by filing for continuance in a
tax haven jurisdiction, usually Bermuda. In addition, in order to be eligible for benefits
under a bilateral income tax treaty, the inverted corporation will claim residence for
treaty purposes in a third country, usually Barbados, through what can be seen as minimal
contracts with that jurisdiction.222 Post inversion payments that take place between the
USco and Bermudaco will be taxed under the regime of the bilateral U.S. – Barbados tax
treaty.223
The dramatic difference between pre- and post-inversion tax treatment without a
corresponding substantive operational or structural change raises important tax policy
concerns. On a general level, it is open to question whether these transactions should be
disregarded as shams. On a technical level the question is why the regulatory tax
221

NYSBA Report at 135.
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Under Barbados law it will be sufficient for the expatriated corporation to conduct director’s
meetings in Barbados to be able to claim residency.
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U.S. bilateral income tax treaties exempts large public companies from the limitation on
benefits article. See L. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions. Part 3, Tax Notes (June 24,
2002).
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measures designed to halt abusive tax transactions – notably the business purpose
doctrine and §269 -- were not brought into play to question corporate inversions.

(1)

The business purpose doctrine
The business purpose doctrine, as applied to reorganizations, provides that

reorganization status will be denied when a transaction is entered into solely for the
purpose of achieving a particular tax result and not “for reasons germane to the
continuance of the business of a corporation a party to the reorganization”224 It will not
suffice for the transaction to meet only the technical terms of the statute, since the
reorganization must partake of those characteristics “which underlie the purpose of
Congress in postponing tax liability.”225 While the mere presence of tax planning will
not cause a reorganization to fail the business purpose requirement, the taxpayer has the
burden of proving the existence of a non-tax oriented business purpose.226 The business
purpose supporting the reorganization need not be its principal motivation and it need not
exceed in importance the tax avoidance purpose; the business purpose doctrine requires
only that the business purpose for the reorganization be real and substantial.227
The disclosure documents accompanying inversions have generally been vague in
their description of the purposes of restructuring.228 Inverting corporations have invoked
a number of reasons in support of their decision to expatriate. Among these are that the
inversion improves the inverting firm’s global tax position, and that itcreates a new
224

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g).
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See Wortham Machinery Co. v. U.S. 521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir., 1975).
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Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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See, e.g. Wortham Machinery Co. v. U.S. 521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir., 1975), IRS TAM
89451004 (7/11/89).
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Certain statements made in support of the proposed inversions raise questions as to their
substantiation, such as the claim that an offshore holding company structure would be beneficial
for a future sale of assets, when there is no indication of any contemplated asset sale. See Triton
Energy, Prospectus/Proxy Statement, op. cit. supra note 21 at 10; or the claim that the postinversion structure would offer a better framework for future strategic alliances, when the
corporation had no plans for strategic alliances or acquisitions, See Xoma, Prospectus/Proxy
Statement, op. cit. supra note 37 at 11.
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corporate structure offering greater flexibility in seeking to lower the worldwide tax
liability and effective tax rate. These purposes, however, are clearly tax-related. It is
also argued that the tax savings will increase the capital that may be committed to
international expansion, which in turn will (1) make the corporation more attractive to
investors, (2) enhance its ability to compete with non-U.S. firms, (3) enhance its ability to
pursue business combinations with non-U.S. entities, and (4) increase its visibility within
the investment banking community as a result of the perception of the company’s
enhanced corporate structure.
It is unquestionable that the net economic value of the corporation will be higher
post-inversion, due to lower tax liabilities generated by the change in its tax status and its
eligibility for new tax reduction techniques. This reasoning, however, views the
economic benefits related to tax minimization as the ultimate business purpose of the
transaction, thereby making a tax-reduction purpose a business purpose. Such bootstrap
reasoning, if generally accepted, would render the business purpose doctrine ultimately
ineffectual. Any transaction that carries a tax saving enhances the value of the company
or shareholder wealth – and this, in turn, could be claimed to justify the transaction.
A possibly more compelling reasoning in support of an outbound inversion would
focus on the location of expansion potentials for the inverting corporation. The inverted
corporation may argue that its potential for economic growth is located outside the
United States and it desires to exploit that opportunity in a structure that is efficient from
the inception of the new foreign operations. The foreign expansion may need additional
financing, easier to be raised in a tax efficient corporate structure. Arguably the removal
of income generated by future foreign operations from the ambit of United States taxing
jurisdiction could be viewed more leniently. However, the likelihood of removing
business opportunities developed while the pre-inversion corporation fully benefited from
the institutional framework, capital markets and economic framework of the U.S., would
still exist.229 Economic studies examining inversion focused primarily on the effect of
the inversion transaction on shareholder wealth.230 There seems to be no indication that
229

For the implications of the migration of business opportunities See Hardy, op. cit. supra note
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See Desai & Hines, op. cit. supra note 15; Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, op cit supra note 108.
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inverting corporations would show a higher growth in foreign income than the industry
median registered.
In these circumstances, it appears that the compliance of outbound inversion
transactions with the business purpose doctrine is, at least, questionable.231 Since,
however, these reorganizations as outbound foreign reorganizations do not enjoy entirely
tax-free status, a challenge of the transaction for lack of business purpose may not always
be effective. If reorganization status were denied in a stock inversion, there would be
little practical consequence since shareholders are in any event taxed pursuant to §
367(a). In the case of asset inversions and combined inversions the denial of tax-free
treatment for lack of business purpose would carry additional tax liability. Asset
inversions, fully taxable on the corporate level, are carried out without shareholder tax.
Combined inversions treat the transfer of assets to a newly created U.S. subsidiary in a
drop down that is part of the reorganization as non-taxable. The non-taxable portions of
these transactions would be at risk if tax free treatment were denied based on absence of a
valid business purpose.

(2)

Internal Revenue Code § 269
An outbound corporate inversion that meets the standard of the business purpose

doctrine may nevertheless be subject to question under § 269 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Section 269(a) grants the IRS authority to disallow deductions, credits or
allowances when, among other cases, a corporation acquires property of another
corporation, directly or indirectly (e.g., by means of a stock or asset acquisition) and the
principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of federal
income tax.232 The purpose to evade or avoid federal income tax is the principal
purpose if it “exceeds in importance any other purpose”233 The determination of the
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IRC § 269(a). The basis of the acquired property in the hands of the acquiring corporation
must be “determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation.” This
would normally be the case, for example, in outbound share inversions, in which no gain or loss
is recognized at the corporate level, and the asset basis of corporate assets carries over.
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Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a).
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taxpayer’s principal purpose is, of course, a question of fact, and the tax avoidance
motive is examined against the aggregate of alllegitimate business reason to ascertain
whether it is the principal purpose of the transaction. But this complex factual inquiry has
caused § 269 to be viewed as a weak tool, without sufficient deterrent effect.234
The rules on disallowance of tax benefits on primarily tax motivated acquisitions
of property appear on their face to be well suited to dealing with outbound corporate
inversions. The origins and the legislative history235 confirm that the objective of § 269
is “to prevent the distortion through tax avoidance of the deduction, credit, or allowance
provisions of the code.”236 An outbound corporate inversion, however, is a transaction
directed toward more than the use of deductions, credits and allowances; its object is to
alter the entire corporate structure. The sanction of § 269 – denial of deductions,
allowances, benefits obtained through the ‘principally’ tax motivated transaction – does
not encompass the tax structuring involved in the inversion, in which the tax ”benefit” is
a switch from U.S. based multinational status to foreign based multinational status. One
possible approach to a § 269 – type remedy might be continued treatment of the inverted
corporation as a U.S. multinational;237 this would represent a denial of the benefits of the
“abusive” transaction, but might not fall clearly within the terms of § 269 without
legislative amendment or at least the adoption of new regulations. These issues with
respect to the application of § 269 prompted the authors of the NYSBA Report to
question how it should be given effect in the case of corporate inversions, and to suggest
the adoption of an initiative that would include adoption of new regulations to clarify the
consequences of applying § 269.238 However, some commentators have accepted in
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NYSBA Report at 139.
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The predecessor to § 269 originated in theR evenue Act of 1943. Following the enactment of
the excess profits tax law in 1940, a market in loss companies developed, which § 269 was
designed to deter. H.R. Rep. No 871, 78th Cong. 1st Sess 49 (1943)
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S. Rep. No, 627, 78th Cong 1st Sess. 58 (1943).
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This might take the form, for example, of denying recognition of the transfers of assets,
thereby – within thegeneral concept of § 269 – denying the deductions, credits or allowances
associated with their transfer.
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NYSBA Report at 139.
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principle that corporate inversions may, if contested, not withstand scrutiny under § 269
of the Internal Revenue Code.239

E.

The tax law’s conceptual framework for the taxation of multinationals.
The inverted corporation claims a tax status that is entirely different from the one

applicable prior to inversion, the basis for this being the change, by virtue of the
inversion, of the corporation’s residence for tax purposes. How does this change of
residence occur when the operational structure of the corporation remains the same? The
answer to this question is found in the conceptual framework of the U.S. tax system
,
which essentially allows a corporation to claim a jurisdiction of residence by virtue of
incorporation, without regard to the location of its economic activities. Section
7701(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code states that a domestic corporation is a
corporation created or organized under the laws of the United States.240 This approach to
corporate residence for tax purposes contrasts with the approach taken by other common
law jurisdictions, which adopt as the criterion of residence the location of the
management and control of the multinational enterprise. The residence of a corporation
is determined in this manner by the location of the operational decisions. Corporate
inversions would be less attractive if they would imply some substantial restructuring of
the corporation, instead of a mere change in filing jurisdiction. Under this approach, an
inversion in which operational decisions remain located in the U.S. would result in no
change in the tax residence of the inverting multinational. The multinational seeking
recognition of its change of residence would, in effect, be required to shift the locus of its
decision making – and therefore, most likely the seat and residence of its board and top
management – to the jurisdiction of inversion. The adoption of this criterion has been
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This seems to be the approach taken by the NYSBA Tax Section. See also Hicks, op. cit. supra
note 3, and Wollman, op. cit supra note 114 (voicing doubts).
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IRC § 7701(a)(5) states that the term foreign, when applied to a corporation or partnership,
means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.
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suggested as a long term solution to inversions, an approach that would remedy a
conceptual inadequacy of the U.S. tax system.241
VI.

Policy issues raised by outbound corporate inversions.
Outbound corporate inversions might be viewed as appropriate actions to

minimize the negative impact of U.S. tax laws that put U.S. multinationals at a
competitive disadvantage with foreign based multinationals.242 Some commentators, on
the other hand, view inversions as unpatriotic acts.243 On the spectrum of opinions
marked by these extremes, a variety of opinions have been expressed as to the nature of
inversions. These are extensively discussed in the cited sources, but briefly reviewed here
only to the extent necessary to assist in the understanding of the inversion debate.
The negative tax policy impact of outbound corporate inversions is
unquestionable. At a technical level, inversion transactions are designed to achieve
objectives “[that] are outside the system Congress established for taxation of U.S.
corporations”.244 The inverting corporation changes its status for tax law purposes
without having undergone any substantial organizational and functional change. Tax
status alterations of this magnitude that are not substantiated by business changes may
undermine public confidence in the consistency and equity of the tax system. This
represents a potentially serious risk to the U.S. tax system, which is based on voluntary
compliance. The inversion phenomenon highlights inadequacies of our tax system that
might be attributed to (i) deficiencies of the basic principles and of the conceptual
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See NYSBA Report; Avi-Yonah op. cit. supra note 77; L. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate
Inversions, Tax Notes (April 1, 2002).
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The position taken by a number of commentators might be summed up by the statement made
by Senator Charles E. Grassley at the announcement of remedial legislation dealing with
inversion transactions and stating “these expatriations are not illegal, but they are clearly
immoral”. Press Briefing Memo on REPO Bill, April 11, 2002 reprinted in Daily Tax Report,
April 12, 2002 at L-11.

243

For a critical overview of the approaches articulating that inversion transactions are
unpatriotic, see R. Goulder, Corporate Inversions: Legally Minimizing Taxes or Treason?, Tax
Notes (July 1, 2002) 1.
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NYSBA Report at 134.
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framework, (ii) gaps of the technical rules and (iii) imperfections of enforcement
mechanisms.
Tax commentators who view inversions as a product of the deficiencies of the
basic conceptual framework of the tax law invariably emphasize that the types of tax
reductions targeted through inversions may legitimately be achieved through other
means. “By forming initially through a foreign parent corporation the venture can achieve
the same tax savings as would be available through a subsequent inversion
transaction.”245 Arguably, an acquisition of the U.S. corporation by a foreign corporation
may achieve essentially the same result, the removal of the operations from the U.S.
taxing jurisdiction.246
This reasoning views corporate expatriations as a response to the
“disproportionate” tax burdens imposed on U.S. multinationals. According to this
approach – endorsed by the Treasury Report on Inversions – “the U.S. international tax
rules can operate to impose a burden on U.S. based companies with foreign operations
that is disproportionate to the tax burden imposed by our trading partners on the foreign
operations of their companies. Both the recent inversion activity and the increase in
foreign acquisitions of U.S. multinationals are evidence that the competitive disadvantage
caused by our international tax rules is a serious issue with significant consequences for
U.S. businesses and the U
.S. economy.”
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These conclusions, while arguable, are not

supported by unequivocal statistical data.248 Nevertheless, the Treasury Report seems to
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Treasury Inversion Report ¶ 54. This technique was recently used by Accenture, Ltd.
Prospectus/Registration Statement, July 19, 2001; Seagate Technology, Inc.,
Prospectus/Registration Statement, April 20, 2002.
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Both the NYSBA Report and the Treasury Inversion Report seem to take this position.
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Treasury Report ¶¶ 5 – 7.
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A battle of statistics has developed around the question whether the “competitive
disadvantage” faced by U.S. companies has caused or contributed to the proliferation of foreign
takeovers of these companies. See Ways and Means Committee Explanation of H.R. 5095;
Organization of International Investment, The Foreign Takeover Myth: Facts about Global M&A
Activity and U.S. Companies Global Business Ranking, (July 26, 2002) 2002 WTD 155-33;
NFTC, Report on U.S. International Tax Policy (Part 4), Tax Notes (April 5, 2002).
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accept the “the excuse of competitive disadvantage”249 and use it in support of its quest
for certain changes in the U.S. foreign tax structure.
The competitive disadvantage excuse is based on the assumption that the United
States asserts a more extensive taxing jurisdiction over the income of domestic
headquartered companies than other countries. Frequently the argument is used in
conjunction with theories advancing the benefits of the territorial taxation.250 It is
important to note, however, that the United States is not unique in asserting jurisdiction
over the worldwide income of multinationals headquartered within its jurisdiction and in
currently taxing their passive income through anti-deferral regimes.
Even if the argument of competitive disadvantage could withstand scrutiny on the
basis of a comparison of effective tax rates, it is subject to other conceptual questions.
The effective tax rate is only one of many factors relevant to corporate well-being and
performance. A starting business makes locational decisions determined by a variety of
factors, which are primarily economic. The decision where to incorporate is often
influenced by other factors. For example, the preferred incorporation jurisdiction for a
corporation that contemplates an IPO will be one that offers legal certainty and
transparency that enhance the value of the corporation. At incorporation, the entity elects
into a system of legal rules, administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms and
societal monitoring framework. It similarly elects into the financial market structure of
the jurisdiction in which it raises its capital. Therefore, a comparison solely of tax
principles may not be conclusive in evaluating the potential advantages and
disadvantages of the choice of a legal system.
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See Avi Yonah, op. cit supra note 77, referring to the “competitiveness excuse.” For a similar
approach, see, M. A. Sullivan, Congress’s Inversion Odyssey: Oh The Places You’ll Go, Tax
Notes 1289 (July 1, 2002). It is generally agreed that the competitiveness arguments advanced by
the Treasury Inversion Report are not adequately supported by numerical data. See e.g., S. C.
Thompson, Treasury’s Inversion Study Misses the Mark, Tax Notes (June 10, 2002) at 1673.
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Inversions were labeled in this context as “self-help territoriality”. See Treasury Inversion
Report ¶ 28. Some authors seem to disapprove entirely of the use of “territoriality rhetoric” in
this context. See, e.g., Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 249 at 1290-1291. Others argue that proposals
to consider territorial taxation are appropriate with respect to active income. See e.g. Thompson,
op. cit. supra note 249 at 1677.
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The inquiry might begin by examining into whether there are economic benefits
conferred upon a corporation by virtue of its status as a U.S. corporation. Would such
benefits bestow a competitive advantage on the U.S. headquartered multinational which
would counterbalance ‘disadvantageous’ tax treatment?251 In response to the frequently
expressed concern that U.S. tax rules operate as a disincentive to corporate location in the
U.S., one may ask whether this jurisdiction offers any competing non-tax incentive for
foreign corporations to locate their headquarters here. Further, are theredomestic
economic benefits offered to domestic corporations that are equally available to foreign
headquartered corporations? These questions seem to be justified in conjunction with
the principle of ‘benefit based taxation’.252
Our overview of the factors facilitating inversions suggests thatlack of distinction
between U.S. and foreign headquartered corporations may have contributed to making
inversions possible. There are at least two alternative ways of addressing this problem.
First, the tax law principles of residence should be re-evaluated to assure that tax
residence is substantiated by the economic ties of the multinational corporation with the
country that asserts residency-based taxing jurisdiction, the United States. Second, the
non-tax regulatory framework should be modified to emphasize the availability of nontax benefits on a residency basis, when appropriate and feasible. [The ineligibility of
foreign corporations for U.S. governmental contracts would be such measure].

Conclusion
Outbound corporate inversions may be facing the prospect of extinction.
Heightened public attention, such as that which accompanied the proposed inversion of
Stanley Works, together with the threat of imminent legislation, brought a halt to the
latest wave of expatriations. As this article is written, direct anti-inversion legislation
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This question is in some respects analogous to asking whether there “is a direct relationship
between the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals and the competitiveness of the U.S.
economy”. See Avi-Yonah, op. cit. supra note 77 at 1795.
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The principle of ‘benefit based taxation’ argues that the taxing jurisdiction asserted and
exercised over a subject are based on the benefits bestowed on the subject by the taxing
jurisdiction. Most recently the principle was articulated by the Joint Committee of Taxation with
respect to taxing jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. The Report emphasized that U.S. citizenship
carries rights and benefits that justify the assertion of extraterritorial taxing jurisdiction.
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has not yet been enacted, and ancillary anti inversion measures – though at a more
advanced stage of legislative consideration – remain to be enacted. If and when enacted,
the legislative changes may well render inversions – at least as they have to this date been
known – no longer desirable.
But the larger policy questions that the corporate expatriation process has brought
to light will not be made to disappear easily. In the world of multinational enterprise, the
questions of taxing jurisdiction, economic benefit and corporate governance are
fundamental.
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